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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Organisation of Armenia's Cabinet and Its Transferral to Yerevan

Despite the unhealthy social and political atmosphere in Tiflis, Armenian national leaders found it difficult to tear themselves away from the city that had long served as their unofficial capital. The inevitable transfer to Yerevan was not anticipated with pleasure. After Khatisian's delegation had returned from to Tiflis, the National Council embarked upon the task of forming a cabinet for the "Republic of Armenia," in whose name the Treaty of Batum had been signed. On June 9, Kachaznouni was selected as premier-designate and was enjoined to organise a coalition government, for Dashnaktsoutiun had no desire to bear the grave responsibilities alone. 82 Having nearly monopolised the Armenian political life for a quarter of a century, the organisation now felt the disadvantageous of the "one nationality – on party" system that had evolved in Transcaucasia. Scarcely 10 percent of the Eastern Armenians adhered to all the other political societies combined. Dashnaktsoutiun had not been found or shaped as a legal institution. It had been revolutionary and anti-governmental, experienced in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, political assassination, and mass provocation, and not it was uneasy at the prospect of sovereignty. Furthermore, the involvement of a revolutionary society in the functions of government would inevitably implicate it in the faults and shortcomings of the administration. Menshevik and Social Revolutionary participation in the Russian Provisional Government was a striking example of this. With such concerns and because of the importance placed upon the creation of a united Armenian front during the critical summer months of 1918, Dashnaktsoutiun advocated coalition.

Kachaznouni was unable to form a cabinet until the end of June. The Armenian Social Revolutionaries, rejecting the ideal of national independence, declined the offer to participate. Nevertheless, they assured Kachaznouni that they would assume the role of loyal opposition. The Armenian Mensheviks, still in a single organisation with their Georgian colleagues, agreed to serve only if granted every ministry of their choice, a demand unacceptable to the other parties. But it was the Populists who caused the greatest concern. Dashnaktsoutiun valued their collaboration more than that of the SR's and SD's, for the representatives of the Armenian bourgeoisie were held in awe. Their financial, economic, commercial, and administrative acumen was believed indispensable to the welfare of the Republic. Yet the Populists were not amenable to the prospect of serving on a cabinet headed by Dashnakists. The blamed Dashnaktsoutiun for the tragic state of affairs. Much of the responsibility of the devastation in Western Armenia, the horrendous evacuation of Kars, and the rape of most of Yerevan guberniia had to be shouldered by the party in charge of Armenian life at the time. Dashnaktsoutiun, now discredited, should voluntarily remove itself from the political scene to male room for new, untainted leaders, who would build the Republic. The Populists proposed that Mikael Papadjanian replace Kachaznouni as Premier-President. 83 There was, of course, considerable logic to the Populist position, but the "one nationality – one party" system made the suggestion impractical. The Armenian masses who looked upon SD's, SR's, and KD's 84 as foreign creations incapable of understanding the basic strivings of the nation, would have been left leaderless. It was also necessary to recognise that the SR and SD parties, tough not joining the cabinet, would assume the role of loyal opposition in a government controlled by Dashnakists but would not tolerate the formation of a bourgeois-dominated ministry. Having failed to produce a desired coalition, Kachaznouni received authorisation on June 30 to select members, not according to political affiliation, but on an individual basis. Immediately thereafter, he presented the slate of his abbreviated cabinet, in which all except the non-partisan Minister of Military Affairs were Dashnakists: 85


Hovhannes Kachaznouni Premier
Alexandre Khatisian Foreign Affairs
Aram Manoukian Interior
Khatchatour Karjikian Finance
Gen. Hovhannes Hakhverdian Military Affairs