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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Attempted German Mediation and a New Ottoman Ultimatum

The strained relations between Germany and Turkey did not escape the attention of the Transcaucasian representatives at Batum. Aware that Germany favoured a conciliatory policy toward the Caucasus and was attempting to circumscribe Turkey's military activities, Chkhenkeli had repeatedly insisted that the Batum negotiations include all Central Powers. For the same reasons, Kachaznouni and Khatisian had turned to von Lossow for advice and assistance. The Bavarian general recognised his limitations, however, and when the Turks demanded the railway to Joulfa, advised the Armenians to comply. 95 He expressed opposition to the Ottoman advance, complained that his voice was ignored by the Turkish authorities, and again promised to inform his government of the flagrant violation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. On May 20, the Armenian National Council sent a special deputation, Hamo Ohandjanian and Arshak Zohrabian, a well-known "internationalist" Menshevik, to confer with von Lossow. They claimed that the Turco-Tatars were plotting to crush Armenia and to snatch the very heartlands around Yerevan. Two days later, their appeal for German supervision and protection was relayed by von Lossow to Ambassador Bernstorff and to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. 96

Meanwhile, the Batum Conference had reached an impasse. Halil insisted on acceptance of the May 11 draft treaty, while Chkhenkeli's refrain was "Brest-Litovsk." On May 19, in a note to the Transcaucasian delegation, von Lossow, presumably having received directives from his government, offered to serve as a mediator to break the deadlock. 97 Immediate Transcaucasian acceptance of the proposal would seem to have been in conformity with aspirations for a relatively favourable pace. Minutes of the delegation's May 19 caucus reveal that this was not so. The meeting was torn with dissension and accusations. While the Armenians called the instant approval of von Lossow's offer, Hajinsky and Rasul-Zade insisted that Halil be consulted on the matter for "psychological reasons." Khatisian objected, stressing that Transcaucasia was free to its basic goals without soliciting the enemy's blessing. The old Georgian revolutionary, Nikoladze, defined the differences between arbitration and mediation: for the former, the sanction pf both parties concerned was necessary, but for the latter, either side could act alone to authorise a third power to intercede. As the session dragged on, guarded expressions gave way to direct indictments. Hajinsky demanded information concerning Chkhenkeli's furtive activity which had led to von Lossow's proposal, and Rasul-Zade complained that the delegation president had left the members in the dark, scheming to present them with an accomplished fact. The delegates did not even know until the opening session of the Batum Conference that Chkhenkeli was to insist on the Treat of Brest-Litovsk as the basis for further negotiations a verbal barrage exploded when the two Moslem delegates requested a recess for at least an hour before giving decision. Enraged, Khatisian denounced the manoeuvre, which would have allowed the Tatars time to inform Halil of the proceedings. Hajinsky retorted that, unless the intermission were granted, he would refuse to vote. 98 Though available records of the meeting do not indicate whether a recess was called, the delegation finally decided to accept German mediation. 99 Describing the incident, one historian of the period has written: "During the entire length of the conference the Azerbaijani [Tatar] delegates had been keeping the Turks informed of the deliberations of the Transcaucasian delegation. Both the Georgians and the Armenians knew that, but there was nothing they could do about it. The debate over von Lossow's offer only made the picture clearer and gave additional proof of the fact that the Azerbaijanis were closer to the enemy than to the state of which they formed a part." 100