Map Close  
Person info Close  
Information Close  
Source reference Close  
  Svenska
 
Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

Previous page Page 427 Next page Smaller font Larger font Print friednly version  
The Surrender of Kars

While still only premier-designate, Chkhenkeli assumed the functions of a legally authorised head of state and foreign minister. He communicated with Vehib Pasha, ordered the Armenian troops to halt their hostilities against the Turks, and finally commanded General Nazarbekian to relinquish Kars without firing a shot. His entire activity was kept secret from the Dashnakist fraction of the Seim and even from those Armenian leaders whom he had approached to enter his cabinet. When his moves were known, Transcaucasia was shaken to its deepest foundations. Armenians and Soviet historians continue to execrate the "treachery" of Chkhenkeli and to impeach him for breach of faith. Though nearly a century has passed, the Georgian leader's manoeuvre still rouse the most impassioned disputations. It is difficult not to chastise Chkhenkeli for his improper and unconventional manner in which he pursued his objectives, yet in retrospect his every move can be justified on the following grounds:


  1. As premier-designate, he was obliged to lead the state, for no other executive body existed. Gegechkori's cabinet had withdrawn from the political arena.
  2. The Seim, during its April 22 session, had charged the Transcaucasian government with resuming negotiations in addition to preparing for defence.
  3. It was clear to all that renewal of the parleys signified acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk boundaries.
  4. The Armenians had voted in favour of continuing the peace talks and by that act had tacitly recognised the inevitability of relinquishing Kars and all other territory beyond the 1877 Russo-Turkish border.


Chkhenkeli's opponents can construct a more formidable case against the wisdom of evacuating Kars than against the legality of the command ordering that withdrawal. If the directive were technically illegal on April 24, it would not have been so two days later when Chkhenkeli was formally confirmed in office. There is nothing to indicate that his views might have changed in the intervening hours. For an understanding of subsequent events, it is necessary to turn to the details of the capitulation of Kars.

On the morning of April 23, a few hours after the Seim had declared the independence of Transcaucasia, Chkhenkeli wired the information to Vehib Pasha and announced acceptance of all provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as the basis for further negotiations. He suggested that the conference between the two governments take place in Batum instead of Trabizond because it was imperative that he as chief of state be near Tiflis. As for the evacuation of Kars, Chkhenkeli promised to appoint representatives to discuss the terms of withdrawal and to direct all Transcaucasian military forces to cease fire at five o'clock that afternoon. 21 Then without waiting for Vehib's reply, Chkhenkeli and the acting minister of War, General Odishelidze, ordered generals Lebedinsky, Nazarbekian, and Gabaev to suspend hostilities. 22 The communiqué reached Nazarbekian's headquarters in Alexandropol at one-thirty in the afternoon. Astounded by the command, Nazarbekian attempted to contact the National Council for clarification, but the wires to Tiflis had been cut. 23 With no alternative, the Armenian Corps Commander relayed the instructions to General Silikian of the 2nd Division and through Deev in Kars to General Ter Hakobian, who had replaced Areshian as commander of the 1st Division. When Deev received the order at four in the afternoon, Armenian troops held the Samavat-Haram-Vartan-Kani Köy perimeter several kilometres from the city. The moral of the troops was high, for all were certain that the greatest stand of the campaign would be made there. The announcement of the cease-fire was the first devastating blow to that optimistic determination. 24