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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The New Viceroy, Grand Duke Nicholas Romanov, in the Caucasus

As the Entente negotiated the division of the spoils, Russian officials in the Caucasus expressed increasing impatience with Armenian political aspirations. This trend became even more pronounced after Grand Duke Nicholas Romanov, who had been replaced as commander of the Russian armies by Tsar Nicholas, was sent to relieve the ailing Count Vorontsov-Dashkov. The new Viceroy, for the Caucasus, casting aside the caution and wisdom of his predecessor, adopted a straightforward policy based on dedication to "Great Russian" nationalism and dislike for minority groups.

In October, 1915, soon after Grand Duke Nicholas' arrival in Tiflis, Khatisian and Haroutounian, reporting on the Armenian volunteers, informed the Viceroy that during the preceding year nearly five hundred men had sacrificed their lives and twelve hundred had been wounded or were missing in the Russian war effort. 112 Yet the official attitude toward the Armenian units worsened, and in December the Supreme Command of the Caucasus Army ordered the National Bureau to liquidate the volunteer contingents, which would then be reorganised into regular rifle battalions of the Russian Army. 113 Implications of this charge stung the political sensitivity of the Armenians, for as integral units of the regular army the new companies could be dispatched to any front. More disconcerting was the thought that motivation to eliminate the special status of the volunteer groups stemmed from tsarist opposition to a special status for Western Armenia. During the first quarter of 1916, over three thousand volunteers, each refusing to become "russky soldat", were discharged. Andranik's large units was completely dissolved, while the men remaining in the other groups were transferred to six Armenian rifle battalions, commanded by regular officers of the Russian Caucasus Army. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich re-imposed strict censorship on the Armenian press and proscribed discussion of the volunteer movement and other vital national questions. 114

In Petrograd, Pavel Miliukov, speaking for the liberal faction of the State Duma, questioned the Armenophobe policy of the government and reported that General Nicholas Ianushkevich, Chief of Staff and a close associate of Grand Duke Nicholas, had encouraged Kurds to adopt a sedentary way of life at the expense of the Armenians, whose families had been murdered by those same ashirets. "We are more friendly to them than to our old friends," complained Miliukov. 115 The official government view, however, was expressed in the June 27 letter of Sazonov to Grand Duke Nicholas. Discussing the future administration of Western Armenia, the Foreign Minister postulated that Russia might satisfy the Armenians by granting full autonomy as envisaged in the pre-war reform scheme or else try to replace the Armenians with Moslems and relegate the political significance of the former to zero. But neither alternative was desirable or beneficial for Russia. Autonomy was impractical since Armenians had "never" constituted a majority in the area, as the result of the recent tragedy, now represented barely a fourth of the total population. Under such conditions, "Armenian autonomy will result unjustly in the minority enslaving the predominant element." On the other hand, favouritism should not be shown the Moslems, for this would make conditions for the Armenians more unbearable than under the Ottoman regime and would certainly drive them to cast glances of envy at their compatriots in the French-controlled districts. "Thus, the Armenians in certain areas might exercise educational and ecclesiastical freedoms, be permitted to use their mother tongue, and be granted municipal and rural self-government…" The same should apply to non-Christians. 116 Grand Duke Nicholas was in full accord as he replied on July 16 that there was absolutely no Armenian question at present and that mention of such a question should not even be allowed. Of course, the Western Armenians should be granted ecclesiastical and educational liberties and the opportunities for cultural development. 117 Obviously this was not "an autonomous Armenia under Russian protection".