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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Seim's Conditions for Peace

Before the program of any party could be considered, an urgent and vital matter demanded attention. On the day the Seim was to convene, the Commissariat had already received the Ottoman response to Transcaucasia's willingness to parley. A Turkish delegation was prepared to depart from Constantinople for Tiflis to engage in preliminary talks concerning the bases for negotiations and to agree on a meeting site for the final conference. Upon notification of the Commissariat's acceptance, the delegation would set sail for Batum. 118 The Tiflis government apparently liked to do things in a grandiose manner. In order to formulate an answer, the Commissariat invited generals, representatives from the soviets, from the political parties, and from the still-to-be-assembled Seim. Hesitant of accepting full responsibility and aware of the sharp political divergences among the Transcaucasian peoples, the temporary administration felt compelled to summon such caucuses. On this occasion, however, all were agreed that the Turks should not be allowed in Tiflis. Quartermaster General Levandovsky reasoned that accepting the Turks in the capital was tantamount to admitting defeat. According to the rules of international diplomacy, a neutral meeting place was indicated. The Seim's only Kadet, Iuly Semenov, feared German collusion in the Turkish actions and advised hat the negotiations progress only with the approval of the Allies. Chkhenkeli struck a realistic chord in pointing out that, because the internal disagreements of Transcaucasia were so evident, it was wiser not to permit the Turks to witness these rivalries. Consequently, he suggested Trabizond or Constantinople as more suitable meeting sites. Sirakan Tigranian of Dashnaktsoutiun felt obliged to insist on the Ottoman capital or even a ship at sea since conditions in Trabizond were as disheartening as in Tiflis. Nonetheless, the gathering finally decided on Trabizond, but added that if the Sublime Porte object to that choice, any other "neutral zone" would be splendid. Should Trabizond be acceptable, Transcaucasia would dispatch its delegation on March 2 and would give orders to permit Turkish vessels carrying the Ottoman representatives into that Black Sea harbour. General Odishelidze relayed the message, through Vehib Pasha, to Constantinople. 119

With the conference site selected, the Seim pondered the conditions for peace. Noi Ramishvili, chairman of a committee to prepare recommendations, reported at the evening session of March 1. He prefaced his remarks by slandering the Sovnarkom. That government was responsible for denuding the Caucasus front and was now negotiating an intolerable settlement with the Central Powers. Therefore, Transcaucasia was compelled to go to the bargaining table to defend her own interests. Ramishvili added, however, that his committee assumed the Ottoman Empire was equally desirous of a just peace. Though some committee members (presumably Armenians) had suggested postponing negotiations until Transcaucasia had time to consolidate its position, Ramishvili believed that no further delays were permissible. Then, raising the crucial question of Transcaucasia's boundaries, the Menshevik spokesman warned that it was necessary to be prudent and realistic. This required the renunciation of pretensions to territory beyond the 1914 Russo-Turkish border, for any other claims would cause reverberations on both sides of that line. "But what shall we do with the motto of the Great Russian Revolution, peace based on the self-determination of peoples?" exclaimed Ramishvili. The heart of the entire world throbbed for Western Armenia and certainly the Seim would strive for a happy solution. Without touching on the question of Ottoman sovereignty, the delegates of Transcaucasia would insist that Western Armenia be granted autonomy. And if Turkey rejected a democratic peace, Transcaucasia would rise to defend its interests. 120