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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Brest-Litovsk Supplementary Treaty and Talaat's Mission

Despite the negative states of affairs in Baku, Soviet delegate Ioffe, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs von Hintze, and the Foreign Ministry Judicial Department chief Johannes Kriege signed the Brest-Litovsk Supplementary Treaty on August 27, 1918. Pertaining to the Caucasus, section VI provided that


  1. Russia would not oppose German recognition of Georgia;
  2. Germany would refuse to assist the military operations of a third power (Turkey) in areas beyond the borders of Georgia;
  3. Germany would strive to prohibit a third power from entering the Baku uezd;
  4. Russia would deliver to Germany either one-fourth of the petroleum tapped in Baku or a certain monthly minimum to be determined later. 26


Georgia's international status was fortified, Armenia's further weakened, and the goal f Enver Pasha seriously jeopardised. The Ottoman Minister of War ordered the 5th, 15th, and 26th divisions to strike rapidly. Despite the official Berlin policy, influential Germans now supported Enver. When he and General von Seeckt notified the German Command that the presence of the British in Baku demanded stringent countermeasures, Ambassador Bernstorff concurred, and Ludendorff urged the Foreign Ministry to accept the Turkish logic. 27 In view of the altered circumstances, the German military leaders realised that the Ottomans could not be denied entrance to Baku. The Berlin strategists now recommended that German units also participate in the campaigns in order to safeguard the enormous stores of oil and to be in a position to convince the Russians that the arrangement regarding the petroleum was still in effect. General von Kress was ordered to deploy toward Baku some of the five thousand German troops under his command. 28

The German assent to the Turkish offensive did not quell the tumult aroused by the conclusion of the August 27 agreement, which created new obstacles to Ottoman domination of Transcaucasia. Russian possession of Baku and German control over Georgia would leave as possible compensation for Turkey only the remaining unfertile and unproductive Armenian territories. It was for just that reason that the Armenian suppliants feared the von Hintze-Ioffe pact and joined the Ottomans in opposition. The Republic of Armenia, the last remaining hope, seemed about to be cast to the Turks as a paltry appeasement.

In despair, during the first days of September, Ohandjanian rushed to Vienna to implore Austrian protection. A diplomatic mission and a few hundred troops, Ohandjanian asserted, were all that was necessary. As recompense, he offered the economic wealth of Armenia. It was not difficult for the sceptical Austrians to comprehend the wisdom of non-involvement, especially after the suppliants had painted the most pathetic scenes of conditions in Armenia. It would have been naïve for the Dual Monarchy to presume that, in return for a battalion or two, raw material would begin to pour into Vienna. Furthermore, the exceedingly sympathetic and polite officials did no conceal that they could venture no action that might aggravate relations with their German or Turkish allies. Instead of categorical refusal, however, the Foreign Minister agreed that, if the Armenians could induce the Ottoman rulers to sanction the participation of Austria in Caucasian affairs, more serious consideration would then be given to assisting the Armenian Republic. 29 In Constantinople, other Armenian suppliants had already met with Austrian Ambassador Graf Pallavicini and military attaché Pomiankowski and had surpassed Ohandjanian in presenting exaggerated economic data in a futile effort to entice the monarchy. Austria was in no position to act affirmatively. 30