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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Sovnarkom's Ambivalence

The catastrophe at Kars caused many supporters of Dashnaktsoutiun wonder if the strategy of the Russian Sovnarkom had not been, after all, the correct path to follow. Had Transcaucasia accepted the inevitability of yielding to the dictated terms of Brest-Litovsk, thousands of lives as well as property and provisions worth millions of rubles might have been spared. Refugees would not have been forced to flee on a moment's notice; a disciplined army could withdrawn in orderly fashion to the new boundaries of Transcaucasia, which, like the Ukraine, would have had the integrity of her remaining lands guaranteed by all the Central Powers. It was even possible that an understanding might have been reached with the Bolshevik government of Russia. The rulers in Kiev were now engaged in such an endeavour. Having arrived at a modus vivendi with the Sovnarkom, the Transcaucasian government might have averted the growing antagonism of central Russia and of the local Communists, whose reports and suggestions bore much weight with Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. Although actual Soviet Russian power was still distant from the Caucasus, nearly every political manoeuvre of the Moscow government affected the fate of the provisions between the Caspian and Black seas.

During the first months of 1918, the Sovnarkom seems to have adopted a dualistic policy toward the Caucasus. It ratified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk but loudly protested the cruelty of the Turkish troops as they advanced into the ceded sanjaks. It took official measures to curtail the activities of Armenian non-Communist organisations in Russia but maintained unofficial ties with those same societies and even assisted Armenian soldiers in reaching the Caucasus. It condemned the Commissariat and the Seim but did not reject the possibility of an understanding with the Tiflis government. Though the territory under the jurisdiction of the Sovnarkom was separated from the Caucasus by the land controlled by the powerful anti-Bolshevik armies of South Russia, the Soviet government tried to prohibit the Turco-Germanic occupation of Transcaucasia, for the Communists were convinced that sooner or later the region would be reunited with Russia. In mid-April, foreign Commissar Grigory Chicherin and his assistant Lev Karakhan complained to Germany about Turkish ad Kurdish atrocities against the Armenians in Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Although the Brest-Litovsk settlement had stipulated that the people of those regions would have the privilege of determining their own political future, the Ottoman rulers were pursuing the traditional policy of eradicating the Armenian nation. Russia had agreed to withdraw from the provinces only at the insistence of Germany. Thus the Berlin government was responsible for the actions of its Turkish ally and was obligated to take immediate measures to prohibit any future excesses. 46 Similar Soviet notes followed later that month when the Ottoman Third Army violated the borders of the Yerevan and Tiflis guberniias. 47

Communist bodies in Transcaucasia attempted to keep peace with the strategy of the Moscow government. In the first days of March, 1918, the Bolshevik Regional Committee endorsed the Sovnarkom's Brest-Litovsk policy and belittled those Transcaucasians who, imbued with "imperialistic tendencies," were scheming for the retention of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Enforcement of the treaty provision for the self-determination of these areas was sufficient. 48 A month later, the Committee chastised the little men in Tiflis for conducting separate negotiations with Turkey; then, following the recall of the Trabizond delegation, it denounced the Seim's decision to renew hostilities. 49 As in Moscow, inconsistencies were prevalent among the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks. On the same day that the Regional Committee demanded compliance with the Brest treaty, the Communists of Alexandropol appealed to the citizenry to defend Transcaucasia from the "Turkish barbarian imperialistic hordes" and even enlisted volunteers. 50 From Yerevan, Bolshevik Makintsian, collaborating with Dashnakist leaders, travelled to Russia to solicit Sovnarkom aid. 51 In Baku, the Soviet fulminated against the Transcaucasian declaration of independence, and during its May 2 session poured insults upon the Mensheviks and the Musavat "beks." However, the participation of Dashnaktsoutiun in the Seim's decision was passed over in silence. Three weeks later, Baku Sovnarkom Military Commissar Korganov claimed that declaring independence had been a Menshevik-Musavat plot to permit Turkish troops unhindered transit over Transcaucasia in their drive to "liberate Baku." Again the Armenian nationalist party was spared Bolshevik curses. 52 In fact, with Shahoumian's approval, a deputation of the Baku Armenian Council had already left the city to secure arms, money, men, and diplomatic support from the Sovnarkom. 53