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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Consul Smith versus the Department of State

Taking an active role in the establishment of the national corps was American Consul Smith, now characterised by Soviet authors as a capitalist and imperialist of the highest degree. Long resident in the Caucasus, he assertedly had learned to manipulate the thoughts and actions of the indigenous peoples. 54 That Smith was a rabid anti-Bolshevik is quite true, but his attempts to win active American support for Transcaucasia did not emanate to much from his aversion to communism as it did from his conviction that a bolstered native army could defend the front and even push southward to link up with General Maude's forces in Mesopotamia. 55 Prior to the November Revolution, he warned Ambassador Francis in Petrograd that the Turks were preparing a new offensive and that Tatar efforts to from military units in Transcaucasia were especially dangerous. Moreover, his endeavours to convince the Georgians to unite wholeheartedly with the Armenians were hindered by German and Turkish agents who secretly promised the Georgian immunity in the event of a military offensive. If the Georgians were assured of solid Allied backing, Smith was certain they would waver no longer and would adopt measures for active defence. 56 However, Francis and American military officials vetoed the scheme to create a Christian army in the Caucasus and admonished Smith to refrain from becoming involved in Russian affairs. 57

The November Revolution reinforced Smith's conviction that his views were valid and that the Department of State should promote his plan. On November 23, 1917, a day before the organisational meeting of the Commissariat, the Consul informed Secretary of State Robert Lansing of Transcaucasia's disposition and pleaded for financial assistance to the temporary government that was to be established. 58 Two days later Smith proudly reported that the November 24 conference had resolved to support the war effort, uphold democracy in Russia, and fight anarchy by creating a provisional administration. The audacious Consul, so out of tune with State Department policy, requested American de facto recognition of Transcaucasia. 59 The responses from Washington were all discouraging. On November 26, Lansing wired that the United States refused to encourage sectionalism, the disruption of Russia, or civil war. 60 Less severe, on December 15, the Secretary of State promised to consult with the Allies about Smith's views, but warned, "Meanwhile, do not commit this Government." 61 Twelve days later the message was dispatched again, "Repeat. Do not commit this Government." 62

Much more concerned with the Asiatic phase of the war, the British and French apparently did not share the qualms of the United States about involvement in Russian affairs. According to Smith's reports, the French military agents in Tiflis had 20 million rubles at their disposal for utilization by local indigenous forces. Several French and British military advisers were also on hand to assist. 63 Unfortunately for the Armenians and Georgians, however, the Allied officers about whom Smith wrote were too few to contribute to frontline leadership. The not-too-efficient Christian soldiers continued to man the trenches, while the Caucasus Army Command, schooled in traditional warfare and designed to regulate a force of several hundred thousand troops, proved incapable to adapting to the partisan manoeuvres that were soon to be required.

As the Central Powers and Soviet Russia negotiated at Brest-Litovsk, Smith exclaimed that the Moslems of Transcaucasia were waiting impatiently for the arrival of the Turks in order to show their true colours. Reminiscent of the 1915 appeals of missionaries was his repeated cry, "Christians will be destroyed." 64 As a foreign representative of the United States government, F. Willoughby Smith was an unconventional and unprofessional diplomat. Yet his dispatches abound with accurate predictions and much common sense. What Armenian would not appreciate the candid message sent to Washington on January 7, 1918: "If we are not to give aid to the Caucasus, we should clear out, giving local Christians notice, so that they can come to an understanding with the Ottomans." 65 But what Smith did not see, or perhaps refused to accept, was that the State Department had given notice several times – "Do not commit this Government." That message Smith did not relay to the Armenian National Council or to the Transcaucasian Commissariat, which, by January, 1918, had turned temporarily from military affairs to a new sphere, often more deceptive and sometimes more tragic than warfare. The immature statesmen of Tiflis attempted to measure their acumen with the five-hundred-year tradition of adroit Ottoman diplomacy.