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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Fall of Erzurum and All Western Armenia

Turkey's momentous diplomatic victory at Brest-Litovsk elicited renewed enthusiasm among the ruling circles of the Empire. On March 10, Enver Pasha triumphantly issued news of the treaty to the armed forces and instructed Vehib to take immediate steps to occupy the sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. 21 Obviously, Vehib list no time in complying, for it was on the same day that he urged Lebedinsky to clear the three regions and apprised Odishelidze of the Turkish march on Erzurum. prior to this official communiqué, men of Karabekir's I Corps had advanced along the main route from Erzinjan to Erzurum and had concentrated at Alaja, approximately 24 kilometres west of the citadel and only a few kilometres from the Armenian positions at Ilija. 22 Karabekir apparently carried out this move without orders from Vehib, who, even after March 10, directed the Corps Commander to delay the offensive until sufficient reinforcements could arrive. Karabekir argued that delay meant famine, for the enemy would have time to evacuate or destroy the provisions in the fortress. Without those supplies the Third Army would starve. 23 On March 11, Karabekir launched a full-scale assault on Erzurum.

A Russian unit of connoneers and approximately four thousand Armenian troops manned the Erzurum front. In late February, Odishelidze's General Staff and Headquarters had transferred to a safer site at Sarighamish. Then, on March 3, General Andranik, entrusted with the defence of Erzurum, had reached the city with nearly a thousand men. 24 Despite his prowess as a guerrilla fighter and his legendary popularity, Andranik could not sufficiently strengthen the strategic positions, nor could he allay the fears of soldiers and civilians. Moreover, as the Ottoman Army neared, the sizable Moslem population in and around the city increased its diversionary blows and restlessly awaited the return of Ottoman suzerainty after two years of foreign rule. As Karabekir struck from the west, Kurdish units attacked from the north and south of the fortress. Unable to discipline his troops to quell the panic among the Christians, Andranik issued an order for retreat less than twenty-four hours after the Turkish offensive had begun. 25 The pandemonium of Erzinjan was repeated, only on a greater scale. Refugees poured through the Kars Gate onto the road eastward as Kurds lay in wait along this bottleneck to pluck their prey. The regulars of the Armenian Corps pushed ahead of the civilian population to save themselves. Unassisted armed bands of Western Armenians held the city until most of the Christians had fled. The intrepidity of such groups slightly mitigated the widespread impression of the distressing cowardice of the Armenian soldier. The frenzied troops and bands retreating from Erzurum killed any Moslems falling into their hands and burned the Turkish villages that lay in their path. 26

According to a report prepared by General Nazarbekian, thirty-two tons of dynamite and sixty-five tons of powder in addition to vast stores of weapons, food, and uniforms were left in Erzurum. The Armenian general maintained that permission to ignite the explosives was withheld, because to grant it would have doomed the entire city and its Moslem inhabitants. 27 Army Commander Odishelidze reported, however, that preliminary arrangements had been made with the Ottoman Command to allow for the gradual withdrawal of this material. He complained to the Tiflis government that a similar agreement concerning the supplies abandoned in Trabizond had not been honoured by the Turks. 28 Not only current Soviet authors but also some of Odishelidze's Armenian contemporaries have accused the general of treachery, of secretly corresponding with Vehib, and of inciting Armenophobia among the Georgian and Moslem leaders of Transcaucasia. In the Seim this disposition was evidenced by the repeated deferment of Armenian-sponsored legislation authorising complete mobilisation and raising the age limit of men subject to military service. Only in mid-April, several weeks after the First Turkish violation of the Erzinjan Truce, did the Seim accede to a new conscription act. During that intervening period, both Moslem and Georgian members loudly criticised the several provincial Armenians councils which had inaugurated enlistment campaigns on their own initiative. 29