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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia

The prevailing disposition in Tiflis differed radically from the sabre-rattling atmosphere in Alexandropol. The whole Georgian Menshevik party had been won over to the belief that it was imperative to renew negotiations immediately. The Turks had overrun the entire Batum oblast; it was senseless and dangerous to be adamant at such a time. Fortunately, Chkhenkeli had foreseen the necessity of resuming talks and had made provisions accordingly with Rauf Bey before leaving Trabizond. After his return to Tiflis, he had continued to correspond with Rauf Pasha, who gave assurances that friendly negotiations could begin as soon as Transcaucasia desisted from its hostile ways and withdrew from the sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. 10 Condemned and even charged with treachery by Armenian historians for his secret dealings with the enemy, Akaky I. Chkhenkeli, nonetheless, was probably the most realistic politician in Transcaucasia. He fully comprehended the intricacies of power politics and was prepared to manoeuvre and bend according to the exigencies of the moment. It was not the more respected theorists or idealists, such as Zhordania or Tsereteli, who were to save Georgia from Turkish invasion. Cunning and calculating, Chkhenkeli served his people in 1918 more effectively than any other Menshevik or Georgian. The policy he had advocated for weeks, a declaration of independence, was finally adopted by the Seim on the evening of April 22.

During that historic session of the Transcaucasian legislature, Dashnaktsoutiun was confronted with two alternatives. By remaining loyal to national aspirations and the Russian orientation, it could reject the Moslem and Georgian decision to separate from Russia, thus committing the Armenians to continue the war alone. On the other hand, by yielding to onerous reality, it could comply with the Ottoman demand for an independent Transcaucasia beyond the Brest boundaries. Despite the undesirability of the second course, there seemed no other feasible path. The Armenians could not stand alone against the Turks, nor could they afford to separate their fate from that of the other Transcaucasian peoples. The only possibility for the physical survival of the Eastern Armenians lay in a common, at least outwardly united policy with the Georgians and, in particular, with the Moslems, the predominant element in Transcaucasia. Although espousing this strategy, the Armenian legislators were unable to feign satisfaction. The benches of Dashnaktsoutiun resembled a funeral wake. Even the Georgian Mensheviks, on whose initiative the declaration was to be made, were far from festive. On the night that Transcaucasia was to become a republic, not one of the internationally renowned Menshevik orators took the rostrum to laud independence. Colourless, second-rate politicians, who recited contradictory rationalisations, rose in the name of the Menshevik "fraction." The words of an Oniashvili, Arsenidze, and Georgadze stood in distinct contrast to the eloquent silence of Tsereteli, Zhordania, and Gegechkori. The Menshevik proxies denounced Russia for betraying Transcaucasia and argued that the region must now act as an independent state in order to gain international prestige and to unite all its peoples. They denied that separation from Russia signified espousing a Turkish orientation. The threats from both North and South necessitated the adoption of a new political formula – independence. 11 Rasul-Zade, on behalf of the Musavat fraction, exclaimed that the new regime in Russia was more oppressive than the former tsarist autocracy. Only independence could spare Transcaucasia from partition and domination by foreign states. Though independence would necessitate the loss of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, it would at least give Transcaucasia the opportunity to develop into a great free nation. 12