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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The Erzurum Congress

Throughout the summer of 1914 the Armenians fearfully considered the probable involvement of Turkey in the impending war. The Eighth General Congress of Dashnaktsoutiun, convening in Erzurum at the same time that the Serbian problem threatened to engulf the whole of Europe, sought to avert Ottoman ensnarement in the conflict. Peace was requisite for the implementation of the February reform measures and for the welfare of the Armenians, most of whom inhabited a natural theatre of war on both sides of the Russo-Turkish border. Though critical of the accentuated narrow nationalism of the Ittihadists and the alarming hostility toward non-Turkic elements of the Empire, Dashnaktsoutiun pledged to collaborate with the government in all efforts to avoid war. Before deliberations on the crucial question had been concluded, however, the delegates learned of the order for general mobilisation. Alerted by the ominous significance of Enver's move, the Congress appointed a committee to formulate the party's policies in conformity with the unfolding course of events and then promptly adjourned. 8

As the delegates hastened to their respective countries or provinces, authoritative members of Ittihad ve Terakki arrived in Erzurum to negotiate with Dashnaktsoutiun. Dr. Behaeddin Shakir, Omer Naji, and Hilmi Bey, accompanied by an international entourage of peoples from the Caucasus, proposed to the Armenian liaisons, Arshak Vramian, Rostom (Stepan Zorian), and E. Aknouni (Khatchatour Maloumian), that in the event of Russo-Ottoman hostilities, Dashnaktsoutiun incite rebellion among the Eastern Armenians who, by harassing the tsarist army, would facilitate Turkish conquest of Transcaucasia. The Ittihadist representatives, disclosing that similar schemes already had been approved by Georgian and Moslem spokesmen from Russia, promised, in return for collaboration, an autonomous state comprising Eastern Armenia and several sanjaks of the Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis vilayets. The three Armenian conferees, respected in Ottoman governmental circles, rejected the feasibility of such a plot and reiterated their party's plea for a sane policy – neutrality. If, however, despite their earnest endeavours, the conflagration should envelop Turkey, the Ottoman Armenians would defend the fatherland and perform all obligations as faithfully and conscientiously as during the Libyan and Balkan crisis of 1911-1913. But provoke revolt within the Russian Empire they could not. 9 The Armenian reply, considered prudent by some, has been judged by others as contributory to the subsequent national cataclysm. The dissatisfied Turkish mission departed from Erzurum without having achieved its objective. 10

When the Ottoman participation in the World War became a reality, the apprehensive Armenian leaders strove to convince the Ittihad government of their fidelity and patriotism. The Patriarch instructed the prelates of all dioceses within the Empire to perform religious service for the victory of the Ottoman homeland. 11 Azatamart, the influential organ of Dashnaktsoutiun, exhorted the Armenians to act as exemplary citizens and to avoid friction with other elements of the Empire. Aknouni and several other leaders of Dashnaktsoutiun depended on their personal friendship with Enver and Talaat to persuade the ruling clique of Turkey that the Armenians were resolved to protect the integrity of the common fatherland. 12 Although most Armenians maintained a correct attitude vis-à-vis the Ottoman government, it can be asserted with some substantiation that the manifestations of loyalty were insincere, for the sympathy of most Armenians throughout the world was with the Entente, not with the Central Powers. By autumn, 1914, several prominent Ottoman Armenians, including a former member of parliament, had slipped away to the Caucasus to collaborate with Russian military officials. Such acts provided the Ittihadist Triumvirate with the desired excuse to eradicate the Armenian problem and eliminate the major racial barrier between the Turkic peoples of the Ottoman and Russian empires.