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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Menshevik Anxiety about Batum

In his role as chairman of the Transcaucasian peace mission, Akaky Chkhenkeli corresponded officially with both the Tiflis government and the Ottoman delegation. Yet he was also a Georgian political leader, and in that capacity secretly communicated with his Menshevik colleagues. The radiograms exchanged during the second week of April, 1918, were particularly relevant to the question of Batum. Chkhenkeli urged the Georgian national Council to take a clear-cut stand, pointing out that, although loss of Batum would violate the territorial unity of Georgia, it was imperative to comply with the Brest-Litovsk treaty. On April 10, Zhordania, Tsereteli, Ramishvili, and Gegechkori rejected that view, for relinquishing the area would be equivalent to suicide for Georgia and the Menshevik party. They deemed forcible enemy occupation of all Georgia preferable to renouncing claims to Batum. In separate wires, Ramishvili and Gegechkori stressed that at least the harbour district of Batum must be salvaged. Chkhenkeli contented that even this was impossible, and on April 11 warned the Menshevik quartet that, were the Turks to capture Batum through a military manoeuvre, they would not stop there. The road to Tiflis would beckon Vehib Pasha into the heart of Transcaucasia. 99 Chkhenkeli had formulated definite, logical convictions, but his colleagues still groped for other ways out of the quandary.

While corresponding with Rauf Bey, the Tiflis government, and the Menshevik leaders, Chkhenkeli also attempted to restrain the Turkish militarists. On April 10, he appealed to General Vehib to halt operations around Batum, at least until the Seim had made a decision about acceding to Brest-Litovsk. On the next day Chkhenkeli and Vehib Pasha jointly wired the commander of Batum, General Gedevanov, to cease all military activity, while Vehib unilaterally warned the Georgian officer that, were belligerent acts to continue after six o'clock that evening, the Turkish Army would launch an offensive. This threat was followed on April 12 by an ultimatum to Gedevanov to evacuate the city by four o'clock the next afternoon. Vehib promised that only the forts would be occupied and that men of the Georgian Corps would be permitted to retain all weapons and execute a formal withdrawal. If, however, an affirmative response were not forthcoming by noon on April 13, the responsibility for the blood of innocent victims would not rest upon the Ottoman Command, which, furthermore, would have no choice but to take prisoner all the defenders of Batum. 100 Noi Ramishvili, in Batum when the ultimatum arrived, frantically appealed to Chkhenkeli to convince the Turks that, were the city spared, every other minute detail of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk would be honoured by Transcaucasia. The reply was negative. Vehib would neither postpone nor alter his orders. Only the immediate evacuation of Batum would stay the Turkish scimitar.