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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Germany's Conflict with Turkey

Refusal of the Constantinople government to halt the advance in Transcaucasia drew sharp protests from Berlin. A pact concluded between the two nations in September, 1916, had bound each to enter not separate agreement without the participation or the consent of the other. 65 The Batum Treaty obviously stood in glaring violation of this stipulation. Conversely, had the Turks known the details of the preliminary Germano-Georgian agreements signed in Poti, they could have confronted the Reich with the same complaint. The Batum and Poti treaties were incompatible. Ramishvili had placed Georgia, her resources, and her railways at the disposal of Germany, while simultaneously consenting to Ottoman utilisation and control of those same transportation routes. He would let the two Central Powers prove which was the dominant partner.

On the day that the National Council of Georgia declared independence, the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Richard von Kühlmann, instructed Ambassador Bernstorff to protest the violation of allied friendship. Bernstorff was to inform the Ottoman government that, since the advance beyond the Brest-Litovsk boundaries had destroyed the Transcaucasian Federation, Germany now


  1. permitted itself a free hand in Caucasian affairs, maintaining its opposition to policies pursued in Kars, Ardahan, Batum and beyond, which were not in accord with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk;
  2. would tolerate no further Turkish advance into Transcaucasia, or any propaganda in areas beyond the Brest boundaries;
  3. granted de facto recognition to Georgia and would sanction its independence if the assent of Russia was secured;
  4. urged the Ottoman rulers to deal mildly and benevolently with the Armenians in the occupied territories;
  5. announced that, in accordance with existing mutual agreements, any diplomatic or military actions undertaken without German approval would be repudiated and the responsibility for these placed squarely upon the Turkish authorities; and, in particular, the Kaiser's government could not fabricate excuses for Turkish excesses against the Christian population if the Caucasus. 66


At the same time, von Kühlmann informed the Austrian Foreign Minister that the Turks had list their equilibrium and were obsessed with the vision of raising the Ottoman flag above Elisavetpol and Baku. The effect such strategy would have in the Palestinian and Mesopotamian theatres was obvious. He urged that Germany's decisions be relayed to Graf Johann Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople, to thwart Turkish manoeuvres to play one ally against the other. 67

The German High Command was in complete accord with the Foreign Ministry. On June 8, General Ludendorff warned Enver that Turkey's treaties with the Transcaucasian states were neither condoned nor recognised. Pointing out that he had often upheld Enver's point of view, Ludendorff stressed that a guarantee of continued German support necessitated respect for the Brest-Litovsk boundaries. The following day Field Marshal von Hindenburg commanded Enver to withdraw all Turkish troops from the Caucasus, for the policy of the Central Powers was not to gain enemies in that region. In what have become a repetitive and futile message, von Hindenburg insisted that Ottoman forces be diverted to the south. Enver Pasha, in Batum to supervise the reorganisation of his Caucasian divisions, scoffed at his German colleagues. Sharply, he called attention to the fact that Ludendorff himself had at one time sanctioned Turkish acquisitions beyond the Brest boundaries. Furthermore, it was not his fault that General von Lossow had chosen to leave the Batum Conference before negotiations had been concluded! In his June 10 reply to von Hindenburg, Enver emphasised that his decision to assist the Moslems of Transcaucasia was unalterable. Leaving no doubt about the intensity of his convictions, Enver pressured the supreme military commander of the Central Powers by threatening to resign as vice-generalissimo. 68