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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Georgian Preparations to Abandon the Federation

During this critical period, the delegates of each nationality were of course concerned about self-preservation of their own people. To the Tatars this betokened the need for close collaboration with the Ottomans and for a further advance. For the Armenians above all others there was ample cause to be tormented by the seemingly inevitable ruin. The only glimmer of salvation was Germany's questionable ability to restrain her Turkish ally. Germany was also the fulcrum of the Georgian pursuit of preservation. There was, however, another necessary condition – severing bonds with the Armenians, for it was clear that they were doomed and Georgia could not afford to perish with them. Consequently, it was imperative to secure German protection and to step out from the tottering Transcaucasian Federative Republic. By the time von Lossow sailed from Batum on the night of May 25, the Georgians had been assured fulfilment of the first measure, and when the Turkish ultimatum was delivered on the following evening, the second step had already been taken.

German-Georgian relations were firmly established by 1918. Although the Georgian volunteer unit serving the Central Powers during the first year of the war had been discredited and dissolved, an active group of Georgian intellectuals remained in Berlin lobbying for the restoration of the independence of their native lands. Ludendorff has written: "In the years 1915 and 1916 in Armenia, we had employed Georgian irregulars, admittedly without any success. Thus we had come into contact with influential Georgians. I could only welcome these relations as I did Georgia's appeal for the protection of the German Empire." 108 It is significant that when, in mid-May, von Mirbach suggested mediation between the Sovnarkom and the Chkhenkeli government, Prince Georgy Machabeli, a member of this Georgian émigré group in Berlin, was identified as Transcaucasia's representative. The mutual advantages of a Georgian-German understanding have already been elucidated. On May 14, three days after the first session of the Batum Conference, the Georgian National Council authorised Zhordania to head a special mission to confer with von Lossow. Germany was to be requested to extend protection over Georgia, to send armed forces to the Caucasus, to release, equip and repatriate Georgian soldiers who, as members of the Russian Tsarist Army, had been taken prisoner, and to support Georgia diplomatically. 109

Batum became a beehive of surreptitious activities. Chkhenkeli, too, held private parleys with von Lossow and delegated the Georgian advisor, Zurab Avalov, to work with von Wesendonck to draft several agreements. Avalov's diary presents a fascinating tale of secret diplomacy. The arrangements were made under the very eyes of the Ottoman and non-Georgian Transcaucasian delegates at Batum.

According to Avalov, Zhordania was again in Batum on May 21: "During frank conversations with members of the German delegation, Georgia's stand was prepared in anticipation of the inevitable collapse of the Transcaucasian coalition. Only a few persons knew of the secret. N. Zhordania, who had come from Tiflis, in his capacity as president of the Georgian National Council and leader of the Social Democrat party in the Seim and in Georgia, was the person on whom fell the difficult task of pushing through in Tiflis the basic acts (the declaration of Georgian independence and the self-liquidation of the Seim)." 110 initially, the Menshevik veteran seems to have vacillated. The establishment of small national states did not conform to Marxist ideals. Despite any qualms of conscience he may have felt, Zhordania soon accepted the wisdom of Chkhenkeli's realpolitik and laboured earnestly and selflessly for Georgia. While still in Batum, he and Nikoladze carefully studied the map of Transcaucasia and drew the boundaries of the Georgia to be created. They also decided what concessions could be made, if necessary, to the Turks and Tatars. They did not seriously consider relations with the Armenians, for it was doubtful that there would be any Armenia at all. Meeting with Khan Khoisky, Safikurdsky, Khas-Mamedov, Usubbekov, Jafarov, A. D. Pepinov, and other Tatar leaders, the Menshevik representatives discussed possible future territorial boundaries. The Tatars claimed to favour the continuation of a "trio" Transcaucasia but felt that, if the Turks were to insist on absorbing one of the component areas, there should be at least a "duo" Transcaucasia. 111 There was no need to mention which of the three partners of the Federation was to be sacrificed.