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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Conflicting German-Turkish Interests in Transcaucasia

Transcaucasian hopes for German assistance were not unfounded, as, by the spring of 1918, the objectives of Berlin and Constantinople were more discordant than at any other time since conclusion of the secret pact of August 2, 1914. Notes exchanged between the German Foreign Ministry and its representatives abroad reveal the growing alarm over the Turkish offensive. Christians were again being massacred, and Germany was again implicated. In 1918, Christian Germany was especially sensitive to irate public opinion. It was German power, not Turkish, which had compelled Russia to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Thus, the violent manner in which the Ottomans pushed into Kars, Ardahan, and Batum sorely embarrassed the political and military leaders of Berlin. On April 30, before sailing for the Batum Conference, General von Lossow received instructions from the Foreign Ministry to strive for a solution favourable to the Armenians. If possible, these Asiatic Christians should receive autonomy in areas of heavy concentration in both Transcaucasia and the Ottoman Empire, and cultural-religious freedom in the remaining regions. 80

During the opening session of the Batum Conference, the strain between the Germano-Turkish allies was evidenced in von Lossow's explanation that he was present to defend the interests of his government. On the following day, May 12, he conferred with the Armenian delegates and expressed unreserved sympathy for their cause. He doubted, however, that his influence was sufficient to restrain the Turks. 81 After promising to keep his government informed about the unbearable Ottoman attitude, von Lossow wired the Foreign Ministry and Ambassador Bernstorff in Constantinople deprecating the violations of Brest-Litovsk. As the Turkish pretensions to Akhalkalak, Alexandropol, and areas near Yerevan, all solidly Armenian, were aimed at exterminating this Christian people and looting Transcaucasia, the general begged that intense German pressure be applied to the Ottoman government. 82

Naturally, the roots of German opposition to the renewed Turkish offensive reached deeper than mere humanitarianism. It happened, as German authors attest, that concern for the Armenians coincided with the military, economic, and political interests of the Reich. The loss of Baghdad to the British and the defection of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire did not overly perturb Enver Pasha and his associates, for as compensation they planned to reshape the Turkish Empire to include the Caucasus and possibly even Transcaspia and the Crimea. For the defence and economic viability of Turkey, it was necessary to transform the Caucasus into a solid Islamic stronghold and to insure the inclusion of Baku in the remoulded state. 83 Already in March, 1918, Enver's half brother, Nuri Bey, had left the Mesopotamian front for Transcaucasia with instructions to organise an Islamic army that would seize control of the area and liberate Baku. 84 Some German military strategists had initially not opposed this move, for it was in the interest of the common war effort. Ludendorff had even agreed to condone Turkish territorial acquisitions beyond the frontiers established at Brest, on condition that the additional lands be occupied rapidly and their loss recognised by the Transcaucasian government. 85 The German Foreign Ministry and most members of the High Command strove, however, to limit Turkey to the sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. They insisted that the Ottoman armies should be concentrated on the Mesopotamian and Palestinian fronts, which had been weakened by British blows. Therefore every effort should be made to avoid conflict with Transcaucasia, which had now accepted Brest-Litovsk. Enver's acceptance would bring peace along that frontier. Even Ludendorff was soon won over to this view. 86

Another aspect of German military strategy was the plan to utilise the Caucasus as a corridor to the Orient. The Berlin-Baghdad route to the East had been blocked by the British. By substituting the "Hamburg-Herat" line via Transcaucasia, German forces could move through Central Asia and Afghanistan toward India. With the British colonial empire placed in a vulnerable position, the London government might be constrained to sue for an armistice. Control of the Caucasus by a jealous Ottoman Empire would hinder such a project. 87 During March and April, 1918, the German Command repeatedly urged a southward concentration of Turkish power, and by May the request became a poorly disguised threat. On May 15, 20, and 25, Ludendorff appealed to General von Seeckt, the German officer serving as Ottoman Chief of Staff, to use his personal influence to prevent further Turkish advances in Transcaucasia. 88