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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The sons of Armenia – heroic defenders of their native land, but by no means farsighted politicians, who have allowed themselves to be deceived time and again by the beasts of imperialistic diplomacy – cannot fail to see that the old path of diplomatic scheming does not point the way to the liberation of Armenia. It is becoming clear that the path of liberation for oppressed peoples lies through the workers' revolution that was started in Russia in October…

Let everyone know that the imperialist policy of national subjugation is countered by the Council of People's Commissars with the policy of complete liberation of the oppressed peoples." 25

As a declaration of principles, the decree "About Western Armenia" complimented the righteousness of Bolshevism, but as a course of action its benefits nullified the first of the following conditions on which self-determination was to be based: "


  1. The withdrawal of troops from the boundaries of "Western Armenia" and the immediate formation of an Armenian militia to secure the safety of person and property of the inhabitants of "Western Armenia."
  2. Unhindered return to "Western Armenia" of refugee Armenians as well as expatriate Armenians scattered in various countries.
  3. Unhindered return to the bounds of "Western Armenia" of Armenians forcibly exiled into the interior of Turkey during the war by Turkish authorities, on which the Sovnarkom will insist at the peace negotiations with Turkish officials.
  4. Creation of a Temporary People's Administration of "Western Armenia" in the form of a Soviet of Deputies of the Armenian people, elected by democratic procedures.

Extraordinary Temporary Commissar for Caucasian Affairs, Stepan Shahoumian, is entrusted to cooperate in every way with the population of "Western Armenia in the task of realising points 2 and 3, as well as to embark upon creation of a mixed commission for the establishment of a deadline and the method of withdrawal of troops from the bounds of "Western Armenia" (point 1)." 26 The decree was confirmed in late January: "The Third Congress of Soviets welcomes the policy of the Council of People's Commissars, which has proclaimed the absolute independence of Finland, has commended the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and has given Armenia the right to self-determination." 27

Unfortunately, neither the Sovnarkom, its Extraordinary Commissar, nor the Congress of Soviets had the means to implement points 2, 3, and 4. In discussing the decree, war correspondent Henry Barby asked, "Was in the naïveté, ignorance or cynicism of Lenin and the Commissar for Nationalities?" 28 Purged Soviet historian Borian seems to have answered: "Consequently, its was necessary to abandon tsarist Russia's policy toward Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan and to prove the logical nature of Soviet policy by demonstrating that it actually does not pursue imperialistic aims. The withdrawal of Soviet troops form Persia and Western Armenia served as the proof of this. The Armenian question thus became the means and not the end." 29 The most tangible effect of the entire episode was the added momentum given Russian soldiers streaming homeward. But in fairness to the Sovnarkom it must be stated that with or without the document in question the Caucasus front would have been denuded. Desertions had reached massive proportions prior to the Bolshevik coup, and there was probably no existing force that could have halted the movement. Moreover, the Caucasus did not recognise the government of People's Commissars, and the military command in South Russia was still dominated by anti-Bolshevik generals. Nonetheless, nearly all Armenian politicians blamed the Sovnarkom for subverting native attempts to stabilise the front and retain the occupied territories.