Complying with Chkhenkeli's directives, General Deev dispatched 1st Regiment Commander Morel to the Turkish camp. There, Colonel Kiazim Karabekir informed Morel that he had received no instructions to halt the operations against Kars. Thus, while the Transcaucasian were not permitted to fire, the Turks were under order to advance. 25 The anxiety of the Kars defenders was relieved somewhat when, on the following morning, Karabekir sent word that the Third Army Command had sanctioned a temporary cessation of hostilities to permit parleys in the field. He added that during those talks the Transcaucasian troops were to withdraw to within two kilometres of Kars. Any resistance would be crushed by the Turkish troops. 26 Simultaneously, Vehib informed Chkhenkeli of these terms and promised to stop the advance at the 1877 Russo-Turkish border and to permit formal evacuation of Kars. He also acknowledged that men of his 37th Division had crossed into the Kutais guberniia but assured the acting premier that they would push no farther unless provoked by Georgian troops. 27
On the morning of April 24, without giving General Deev enough time to receive instructions from Tiflis relating to Karabekir's stipulations, Turkish contingents advanced toward the walls of the fortress. Other units attempted a flanking manoeuvre to size Mazra, a village to the east of Kars along the main road and railway to Alexandropol. General Deev ignored Karabekir's warnings and bombarded the enemy troops moving from the west, while companies of Ter Hakobian's 1st Division repelled the Turkish forces near Mazra. The Ottomans halted. 28
Shortly after noon the same day, another blow from Tiflis struck. The new acting Minister of War, G. T. Georgadze, notified the defenders that he and Chkhenkeli had acceded to all Turkish conditions. Nazarbekian was informed that a misunderstanding troops had apparently arisen about whether its was the Transcaucasian troops who were to take positions two kilometres from Kars or the Turkish units who were to stop at that point. The Armenian Corps Commander was instructed to group behind that line to avoid any distasteful episodes. 29 Tom comply with this order would signify certain doom for Kars, because the fortress cannons, which could inflict severe damage on an enemy several kilometres distant, were useless against an opposing force within close range.
With the Armenian leaders in Tiflis still unaware of what was happening, Chkhenkeli again wired Vehib in order to account for the unfortunate attack on Turkish troops near Kars following the cease-fire. He assured Vehib that all Ottoman terms would be honoured and requested one month to complete the evacuation of Kars. 30 Then Chkhenkeli, once again without awaiting an Ottoman reply, instructed Nazarbekian to communicate before midnight with the enemy commander on the Kars front to arrange the details for evacuation. News of the order spread rapidly through the Transcaucasian units and the preponderantly Christian population of Kars. Nothing more was necessary to trigger an exodus. The chaos, panic, and desertion of Van, Erzinjan, and Erzurum were fully reproduced. 31
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