The flow of statistics had not overt effect on the Turkish authorities until the autumn of 1918, when, for reasons other than validity of the Armenian thesis, they indicated willingness to offer limited support to the "Yerevan Republic." After the conclusion of Soviet-German Supplementary treaty, Enver confidentially informed Khatisian and Aharonian that Turkey would champion the Armenian right to Lori-Pambak and that he was confident a satisfactory arrangement could be worked out with Azerbaijan. It was even possible that the boundaries of the Yerevan Republic might be extended to the shore of the Arpa-chai River, the western limit of the guberniia. Turkish patronage was conditional, however, upon the willingness of the Armenians to act as allies, turning their backs once and for all on Britain and Russia, and possibly entering an Azerbaijani-Armenian-Ottoman confederation. The latter project was the subject of several interviews, but the Armenian delegates remained as noncommittal as the occasion would permit. The prospect was frightening, yet a decisive negative response was not given. 72
After Talaat returned from Berlin, more sweeping promises were made. The Grand Vizier stated that his government was prepared to grant the Armenians more than they themselves had requested during the preceding months. Khatisian wrote Ohandjanian that the change in Turkish heart was undoubtedly prompted by the unfavourable course of the war. Yet he advised extreme caution, stressing that, even at this late date, if the Ottomans were to propose a workable agreement, he would favour immediate acceptance. To wait for the Western Allies to establish a viable Armenian state would be foolish. True, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson had made certain pledges and commitments. They spoke of liberation and justice, but "what do such statements mean?" asked Khatisian. "We must create our own government ad effect a fait accompli, and this must be done with the assistance of Turkey." On a personal note the Armenian Foreign Minister reported that his wife had just given birth to their first child and that the delegation considered the boy a symbol of improved future Armeno-Turkish relations. 73 In retrospect, it may be said that, if the birth of the a son was a good omen, his death in pneumonia nine days later might have been interpreted as signifying continued and violent animosity between the two peoples.
Following formation of Izzet Pasha's cabinet in the second week of October, the new Grand Vizier and War Minister conferred several times with the Aharonian mission. He knew that his task was to lead Turkey out of the war and that the Armenians would soon be knocking on the doors of the Allies. Those governments had repeatedly indicated that the Armenians would be indemnified at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Izzet, now the suppliant, urged Aharonian and Khatisian to inform the victors that Turks and Armenians were in accord. In return, the Ottoman government would recall all troops from Transcaucasia, release and compensate those Armenians seized for forced labour, 74 condone the repatriation of all refugees, and assist in retrieving Armenian women and children unwillingly converted to Islam. 75 Still, there was no mention of Western Armenia. On October 24, Aharonian wrote Izzet suggesting the recall of Shevki and Nuri pashas. The two militarists had caused the Armenian people much agony, and it was not in Turkey's interest that they remain in the Caucasus. Aharonian also requested that Armenians still in Baku be permitted to leave by rail and sea. 76 On the following day the Ottoman government replied that all its troops would be evacuated from the Caucasus in the shortest possible time. 77 On October 27, notifying the Grand Vizier that his delegation was returning to Transcaucasia, Aharonian again urged the immediate withdrawal of Ottoman forces, adding that no rolling stock should be taken from Armenian to Turkey. 78 Izzet then disclosed that Shevki Pasha had already received orders to complete the evacuation within six weeks of October 24 and, in the meantime, to facilitate the return of refugees. 79
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