The plight of Transcaucasia was aggravated by the disloyalty of the Moslem populace in the war zones. Thousands of Georgian Moslems inhabiting Ajaria collaborated with the Turkish forces that moved into Batum, the district's major city. Religious identity played a much more significant role than did national origin in determining political loyalties. During the week following the capitulation of Batum, Moslem villagers in the Ozurget region of the Kutais guberniia and in the Abastuman district of Tiflis struck the Georgian defenders from the rear and welcomed the forward contingents of the Turkish Army. Except for a minor victory on the Cholok River, the Georgians retreated steadily along the railway from Batum to Kutais and inland through the defile of the Kur River toward Borzhom, gateway to the lowland route to Tiflis. 6
The adverse course of events compelled the Menshevik leaders to reassess their strategy. Nevertheless, on April 20, a Zhordania-dominated conference of he party's Tiflis and Regional committees rejected a proposal to declare independence and name Chkhenkeli premier of Transcaucasia. It is not clear what transpired overnight, but the same Zhordania, as Chairman of the Georgian National Council, which met on April 21, acquiesced to the desire of the Georgian people to declare the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia and to install a "peace cabinet." The candidacy of Chkhenkeli was approved by the Council, and on the following day, I a volte-face, the Menshevik party also endorsed the proponent of peace. By April 22, the Georgians had reached a decision. 7
Meanwhile, minor skirmishes took place on the Kars front. Generals Lebedinsky, Nazarbekian, and Deev, Colonel P. Chardigny of the French Military Mission, and several other officers personally inspected the field and satisfied themselves that the fortress could withstand an enemy assault for several months. The inspection had just ended on April 19 when a limited Turkish offensive threw the Armenians back to Begli Ahmed and three days later to VladiKars, only a few kilometres from the fortress. 8 The Armenian Corps Command was undaunted, however, for it was firmly convinced that Kars would hold. The Georgians may have relinquished Batum without a struggle, but Nazarbekian had no such intension for mighty Kars.
General Nazarbekian and his staff attended a special conference of Armenian political and military leaders in Alexandropol on April 20 and 21. This was the most comprehensive Armenian gathering since the National Congress of October, 1917. Among those present were members of the Bureau of Dashnaktsoutiun; militarists Silikian, Dro, Ruben, Andranik; National Council delegates Aharonian, Papadjanian, Haroutounian, Aghbalian, Mamikonian; Western Armenian Defence Council delegate Vahan Papazian; Kachaznouni and Khatisian, newly returned from Trabizond; and even a Bolshevik, Poghos Makintsian. Acting as a self-appointed policy-making body, the Alexandropol conclave was faced with the choice of accepting the Brest settlement together with the loss of Kars or continuing the ravaging war. Kachaznouni described in detail the proceedings at Trabizond and implored the Armenian leaders to accede to the treaty. Former Duma and Ozakom member Mikael Papadjanian and several others concurred with Kachaznouni, but the overwhelming majority of the political-civic leaders and all of the military representatives rejected this stand and pledged an active defence against the murderous invader. The decision was transmitted to Tiflis by the many Seim and National Council members who participated in the Alexandropol deliberation. 9
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