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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Thus, by the beginning of September, Armenian efforts in Moscow, Berlin, and Vienna had been frustrated. In an ironic paradox, the Republic now turned to Talaat Pasha, who was travelling to Berlin in an attempt to abrogate the August 27 treaty. Just before entraining, the Ottoman Vizier promised the Armenian delegation in Constantinople that, while in Berlin, he would demand German recognition of their republic. Certainly, from the Ittihadist point of view, a feeble and dependent Armenian state was preferable to Russian re-absorption of the area. When Talaat, accompanied by Count Bernstorff, reached Berlin on September 27, he learned that Germany and Russia had ratified the Brest-Litovsk Supplementary Treaty on the preceding day. He was enraged but found himself in an awkward position, for he had come not only to undo the pact but also to seek additional German material assistance. British forces, having broken through in Palestine, were advancing northward, and in the Balkans, Bulgaria had already taken steps to extricate itself from the war. Nonetheless, Talaat pressed the Kaiser's government to acknowledge at least Turkey's special interest in the Moslem-populated areas of Russia and to guarantee a degree of Ottoman influence in Transcaucasia by according recognition to the Armenian and Azerbaijani states, whose creation had been sanctioned by Turkey. 31 Germany's attitude was glaringly inconsistent. While the militarists defended the Turkish advance on Baku, the Foreign Ministry circle persisted in its demand that the Ottomans honour the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdraw to the eastern borders of Kars and Batum. The Armenians supported both Talaat and the Berlin Foreign Ministry, as they craved both German recognition and Ottoman evacuation. Arshak Zohrabian, however, chastised his colleagues for what he termed an incongruous policy. The August 27 Supplementary treaty placed Armenia in the Russian sphere if influence and, therefore, both the Sovnarkom and the Reich would undoubtedly compel the Ottomans to quit the Yerevan guberniia. With this protest, Zohrabian continued, insistence on the perpetuation of an "independent republic" was playing directly into the hands of the Turks. Talaat was trying to win German recognition of Armenia not because of his fondness for the Armenians, but because it would permit Turkey to retain all territories acquired by the June 4 Batum Treaty and to relegate the reminder of Armenia into a subsidiary domain. 32 Zohrabian's views were not shred by Ohandjanian or the suppliants in Russia and Constantinople, who continued to press for both recognition and evacuation.

The outcome of Talaat's mission to Berlin was the drafting of a protocol signed on September 23 by the Grand Vizier and by Foreign Secretary von Hintze. The statement of accommodations noted the following:


  1. The Ottoman Empire was prepared to recognise Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.
  2. Germany was prepared to recognise Georgia but regretfully could not recognise Armenia or Azerbaijan.
  3. In the event of Russo-Turkish conflict arising from Ottoman recognition of the two Transcaucasian states, Germany would try to settle the dispute.
  4. Turkey agreed to withdraw all military units from Azerbaijan and Armenia, after which the Kaiser's government would strive to induce the Sovnarkom to waive its objection to Ottoman recognition of the two republics.
  5. The Ottoman government declared its intention to establish separate states in the North Caucasus and Turkestan and to ally with them but understood that Germany could not help in this venture.
  6. The Berlin government would influence the Transcaucasian states to place all economic resources, including oil, at the disposal of all four Central Powers.
  7. Germany acknowledged turkey's interest in the Crimea. Turkey pledged to prevail upon Azerbaijan to deal favourably with German colonists in that republic.
  8. Ottoman troops would evacuate Persia as soon as operations against the British had been concluded. 33


The final German-Turkish accord of the war years was considered a victory for the Armenians. The Ottomans were to withdraw as far as Kars oblast, meaning that the Republic would retrieve the ceded half of the Yerevan guberniia, and, though not acknowledging Armenia's status itself, Germany would pressure Russia to grant indirect recognition. But the elation of the Armenian envoys was stifled by news that, a week prior to the September 23 protocol, Turkish troops had swept into Baku and massacred thousands of Armenians.