Chkhenkeli, during the second plenary session on March 16, acknowledged Rauf's blunt inquiry by announcing that a declaration relating to the form of government soon would be made by the Seim. Indeed, Transcaucasia's repudiation of Brest-Litovsk before the nations of the world and its participation in the Trabizond Conference attested to its having already entered international diplomacy as a separate state. 42 During the third session, Rauf riddled Chkhenkeli's opposition to the acceptance of Brest-Litovsk as the basis for the current talks. As if the Transcaucasians were unaware of the facts, Rauf carefully explained that international agreements between two sovereign states could not be imposed upon a third nation if the latter had established independence and received recognition prior to the conclusion of the said accord. Consequently, since Transcaucasia had satisfied neither condition, it naturally was still considered an integral unit of the Russian Republic. That the Commissariat had refused to send delegates to Brest, that it had desired to confer with the governments of other border areas of Russia, and that the Russian Caucasus Army Command was still in charge of military activities were adequate indications that the region had not, in fact, separated from the former Romanov Empire. Now, however, learning of Transcaucasia's wish to guide its own destiny, the Sublime Porte would be pleased to enter into friendly relations founded upon the stipulations of Brest-Litovsk. 43
The Ottoman position was quite clear and painfully logical. A commission composed of Chkhenkeli, Khatisian, Hajinsky, and Gvazava contrived counter-contentions, which were delivered by the Chairman at the fourth plenary session on March 20. 44 Futilely, Chkhenkeli argued that the Brest negotiations were void because the Sovnarkom did not represent Russia, a land in the throes of civil war. He repeated that Turkey had expressed willingness to recognise Transcaucasia as early as January 14, 1918, and had reiterated this in messages of February 14 and 23. The Trabizond Conference itself testified of both governments to establish cordial relations, but this would be impossible were the Ottomans to insist upon the validity of Article IV. Chkhenkeli reassured Rauf that the Seim, prior to ratifying a treaty of peace, would fulfil all requirements for the founding of sovereign states. 45
Rauf needed little time to prepare a rebuttal. He pointed out that civil wars had no effect on international acts unless the existing government were overthrown. Dispersal of the Constituent Assembly was sufficient proof of Bolshevik control. Therefore, agreements concluded by the Sovnarkom were binding for all parts of Russia except those, such as the Ukraine, which had proclaimed their separation and received international sanction. Then, engaging in a bit of double-talk, Rauf added that the Ottoman peace proposals had been made prior to the Brest treaty and that mere negotiations between two parties did not necessarily signify mutual recognition. The Ottoman government, he asserted, was participating in the Trabizond Conference only to clarify certain economic and commercial matters not dealt with at Brest-Litovsk. Rauf concluded decisively, "It would be desirable for Transcaucasia to declare its independence and announce the form of government before these negotiations can come to a final agreement so coveted by both sides." 46
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