An additional treaty and a special agreement for the exchange of war prisoners were also concluded that day. 45 It was the Batum Additional Treaty that attested to Armenia's being a vanquished nation. The government of Armenia was compelled to demobilise all troops immediately, retaining only a limited force with specified zones of operation to be determined in consultation with the Ottoman Empire. These restrictions would remain in force until the establishment of world peace. All officers and civilian representatives of nations at war with the Central Powers were to be expelled from Armenia. Ottoman troops and material would be transported unhindered over Armenian territory. A special mixed commission would arrange for the use of roads and railways, and the Armenian government would be held responsible for any form of obstruction. Furthermore, the Ottoman Army reserved the right to utilise its own forces if the Armenians proved incapable of maintaining order and facilitating transportation. At the behest of Turkey, other Central Powers were to be granted any of all of the privileges outlined in the Additional Treaty, which, in contrast to the primary treaty, was to take immediate effect. The heel of the Ottoman Empire pressed heavily upon the 7,200 square kilometres of the Republic of Armenia. 46
Soon after the Armenian delegates had left the conference room, the Ottoman representatives greeted Mahmed Hasan Hajinsky and Mehmed Emin Rasul-Zade. With nothing to dispute, the Azerbaijani delegates, in a cordial and festive atmosphere, affixed their signatures to a pre-formulated treaty. Halil and Vehib assured their racial and religious brothers that Ottoman assistance would be made available immediately. 47 Georgia was the last of the Transcaucasian republics to come to terms. After signing the Germano-Georgian accord in Poti, Noi Ramishvili had come to Batum to seek a favourable settlement with Turkey. In notes to the Ottoman delegation, he had insisted on the inviolability of the Brest-Litovsk boundaries, yet had tactically insisted the loss of Akhalkalak and most of Akhaltsikh. That, however, was the maximum Georgian concession. 48 Late at night on June 4, Halil, in an extremely agitated mood, called upon Khatisian. He was angered by Ramishvili's obduracy and counselled the Armenian delegation chairman to reason with and exert pressure on his old associate. Halil warned that thousands of Armenians in Georgia, especially in Tiflis, would be endangered should Ottoman forces be compelled to attack to bring the Georgian government to terms. Nevertheless, Ramishvili, fortified by the assurance of German support, refused to sign the treaty until almost daybreak on June 5, when Halil Bey finally agreed to strike out Turkish demands for the Abastuman district in northern Akhaltsikh. 49
As a grand finale to the round of peacemaking, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish delegates gathered to sign an accord affecting all four states. It was determined that the rolling stock of the Transcaucasian Railways System would be divided in proportion to the length of track falling to each of the countries. 50 Armenia was again the loser. Turkey controlled the Transcaucasian rails from Sarighamish to Joulfa and throughout the Batum oblast; Georgia possessed the tracks radiating from Tiflis toward Baku, Batum, and Gharakilisa; Azerbaijan inherited most of the Baku-Tiflis and Baku-Petrovsk railways. The Republic of Armenia had approximately 48 kilometres of track between Djadjour and Gharakilisa; even this was still occupied by the Turks. The only rails under the actual jurisdiction of the Republic ran from Yerevan to Noragavit, a distance of 6.4 kilometres. The Armenian Railway Administration began its operations with two dilapidated locomotives, twenty rickety freight cars, and one passenger coach. 51
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