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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

- In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The need for bread was closely related to the refugee problem. Armenia was staving. As a unit of the Romanov Empire, Transcaucasia had received wheat from the rich grain-lands north of the Caucasus Mountains. This source was no longer available. Aggravating the situation was the Turkish occupation of the Yerevan guberniia's best cropland. Even on the remaining soil, there was little to harvest because of wartime devastation and the countless refugees who trod over the fields. Aharonian and Khatisian begged Ottoman officials to intercede by persuading Azerbaijan to sell a small share of the abundant cereal crops of eastern Transcaucasia to the Armenian government. Rasul-Zade and Ali Mardan Topchibashev, in the Ottoman capital to seek Turkish support, would certainly accede were the request come from Enver Pasha. Transportation of the vital goods could be easily arranged by Halil. Mürsel, Nuri, and Essad. Yet the suppliants must have known that their entreaty could not be considered seriously, for, while Ottoman and Azerbaijani troops were battling the Armenians of Baku, it would have been ironic at the least were the Armenians of Yerevan to be fed by Moslems. The Ottoman officials regretted that they could not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation and suggested that the Armenians attempt direct negotiations with the Azerbaijanis. 64

A more likely source for economic relief was the Ukraine, which, having established bonds with the Central Powers, had sent representatives to Constantinople. 65 mentor Buniatian, economic adviser to the Armenian mission, conferred with the Kievan Delegates and proposed that from the Ukrainian grain, which was sufficient to feed millions, a small fraction be exported via the Black Sea to Batum or Poti, whence with Turkish to German beneficence it would be transferred to Yerevan. 66 The Ukrainians promised to urge favourable action by their government, and, in fact, the Armenian diplomatic representative to Kiev, Grigor Dsamoev, did succeed in negotiating the sale of 200 tons of sugar and 1,000 tons of wheat. 67 There is, however, nothing to indicate that the foodstuffs were ever shipped. Undoubtedly, transportation problems and political changes caused by the defeat of the Central Powers precluded delivery. 68

Amidst its other activities, the Aharonian delegation strove to convince the officials of Turkey and the other Central Powers that the Republic could not prosper or even survive on the 7,200 square kilometres of Transcaucasia's most barren land. Statistical expert Gevork Khatisian prepared numerous impressive charts and graphs to bolster Armenia's claim to an additional 25,600 square kilometres, not including the ceded territories of Kars and Ardahan. This goal could be realised if the Turks were to return Akhalkalak and the half of the Yerevan guberniia acquired by the Treaty of Batum and if parts of the Elisavetpol and Tiflis guberniias were joined to the Republic. While the Armenians revived the ghost of their zemstvo scheme, Georgian and Azerbaijani delegates were equally active in disproving the presented evidence and even extending the pretensions of their nations to the small area under actual jurisdiction of Kachaznouni's government. From the southern half of the Yerevan guberniia, Rasul-Zade and Topchibashev demanded all land not annexed by Turkey. Azerbaijan coveted 800 square kilometres of Sharur-Daralagiaz, 309 of Nakhichevan, and 323 pf Novo Bayazid, with a combined population ration of three Moslems to one Armenian. Moreover, if Turkey waived her right to much of the Yerevan guberniia, Azerbaijan would annex over half of that area's 8,000 square kilometres. Armenian counterclaims included the entire Yerevan guberniia and over 9,600 square kilometres of Elisavetpol. In the latter region, Armenians outnumbered Moslems three to one. The Armeno-Georgian contest centred around the Lori-Pambak-Kazakh districts, approximately 5,600 square kilometres populated by 30,000 Moslems, scarcely 1,000 Georgians, and more than 150,000 Armenians. It the Turks cleared neighbouring Akhalkalak and Tsalka, the dispute would naturally extend to that district as well. In the total contested area there were, according to the pre-war Russian statistics cited by the delegation, 940,000 Armenians, 470,000 Moslems, 7,500 Georgians, and 34,000 others. 69