The Russian general was responding to Vehib Pasha's historic note of February 12, 1918. The document was an indictment of the Armenians, who had no pity for the innocent Turkish inhabitants. Real power had slipped from the hands of Colonel Morel and the Russian troops into the clutches of Murad of Sivas, and outlaw for twenty-five years, who had been condemned to death in absentia by the Ottoman government. Vehib concluded: "Despite my convincing appeals and your sincere promises, the crimes and atrocities in the areas evacuated by your troops, instead of ceasing, have passed all bounds and have created such a situation that it is thoroughly impossible for me to hold my troops in the role of silent spectators, since they hear and are aware that their parents, children, wives, and relatives are doomed to annihilation. Therefore, considerations based on humanity and civilisation demand the improvement and rectification of this situation by taking decisive and undelayable measures in the evacuated areas. It is only for this reason that I am compelled to push forward parts of the military units from the two armies under my command. 87 However, I hasten to add that this does not constitute an enemy act against the Russian Army… I warmly and sincerely assure you that the Erzinjan temporary truce continues in force except for the paragraph respecting the demarcation lines, which, because of the withdrawal of the Russian troops, automatically loses its significance. This action is resorted to only in the name of humanity and civilisation." 88
The Ottoman armies advanced. Current Turkish authors are nearly unanimous in citing the excesses by Armenians as the prime motivation for the foremarch of the I and II corps. Not fifteen hundred, but assertedly thousands of Moslems were annihilated by the lawless bands of Christians. 89 Armenian authors and military participants maintain that every effort was made to live in peace with the Moslems. Turkish civilians were repeatedly promised security if they remained calm. That measures were taken against the Moslems is not denied, but these were adopted only after Turks and Kurds, taking advantage of the Russian evacuation, attempted to paralyse the supply routes and defensive positions. 90 Soviet historians, reserving earlier condemnations of both Turks and Armenians, later stressed that the Ottoman notes of December-February and the rationalisation of Vehib Pasha were necessary prerequisites for violating the Erzinjan Truce. 91 It can not be ignored that the date chosen by the Ottoman Command to launch a drive to retrieve Western Armenia and to conquer Transcaucasia came two days after Trotsky had delivered his "no war, no peace" declaration at Brest and a day after General von Ludendorff had sanctioned a Turkish offensive. Enver Pasha seems to have lost no time in seizing the opportunity to push toward the horizons of Turkestan.
Karabekir's corps struck at the Erzinjan defences from the direction of Kemakh and by February 13 had nearly surrounded the city. Murad attempted to convince Colonel Morel to hold the city a day or two longer so that the Christian population could be evacuated, but the more experienced Russian officer considered the task impossible. By evening the order for retreat was given. As during the 1915 evacuation of Van, the disorganisation and panic were catastrophic. The Armenian townsmen, having made no preparations for a withdrawal, now fled into the freezing night with whatever they could carry. Soldiers abandoned their units to seek their families. The disorderly throng, trudging through deep drifts of snow, was ambushed repeatedly by Kurdish bands. 92 By the time this sorry company reached Mamakhatoun four days later, half the refugees had been killed, frozen to death, wounded, or frostbitten. Morel's men were ordered to regroup at Mamakhatoun, but the confusion was so great that neither troops nor civilians stopped until they were a day's march from Erzurum. 93 Behind the new defence perimeter scurried thousands of refugees from lands extending westward nearly a 160 kilometres.
General Odishelidze seems to have committed a serious blunder when he forbade the destruction of the numerous caches of food, supplies, and armaments left in the abandoned territory. Reasoning that after a peace treaty these valuable good would be returned to his army, he ordered their surrender to the Turks. 94 Corps Commander Karabekir later wrote that his men were nearly starved at the time of the offensive and that, had the attack been delayed another two weeks, his force would have disintegrated. 95 Throughout February and March the Turkish troops never had more than a few day's provisions, but they capitalised on the continued refusal of the Caucasus Army Command to destroy the tons of foodstuff and military material before retreating.
Karabekir's victory at Erzinjan earned messages of congratulation from the Ottoman Minister of War as well as from the Third Army Commander; but while the latter spoke of the necessity to liberate Erzurum, Enver's imagination had flown far beyond. In his cipher to Karabekir, the Pan Turanic champion imparted that the Moslems of Russia had already expressed their Ottoman sympathies and that they had formed armed units in the area around Baku to free that Islamic stronghold from the Russian and Armenian usurpers. Karabekir was Enver's choice to direct Moslem military activities in Transcaucasia. The I Corps Commander and future leader of the Turkish Nationalist movement replied that only after emancipating the homeland from enemy occupation should the battle for Transcaucasia begin. He felt assured that part of the Ottoman Army could then be deployed to Baku and North Caucasus; even if this were found to be impractical, it would not be difficult to oversee partisan warfare in those areas. 96 Logically, Karabekir listed the Ottoman objectives as first the 1914 borders, then the territories lost in 1878, and finally the expanses beyond. These were the prevailing circumstances when, in mid-February, 1918, Gegechkori informed the Ottoman government that Transcaucasia was prepared to negotiate and the Seim would soon announce conditions for an acceptable and just peace.
|
