Indeed, beside such ideas which were forming the Turkish foreign policy, there were other factors which were in no way less significant. These were described in article 165 in the report which was presented to the parliamentary assembly of the West European Union (WEU) in connection to Turkey's application to this institution: "It should be noted that the claims concerning the ethnical and religious affiliations with Azerbaijan are not the only reasons for Turkey's uncompromising attitude towards Armenia, which Turkey has in several occasions stigmatised as aggressor. It has also strategic and political reasons to feel indignant towards the possible Armenian military and political success in the conflict. One of them is that the Armenian successes not only strengthen Armenia's claim to the region in north-eastern Turkey, which used to be populated by Armenians until the mass-deportations, mentioned in article 152. The Armenian successes would also harm Turkey's position as negotiator and protector of the Muslim population in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Furthermore, Armenia has good relations with Iran, which has treated Armenia and its population in a much better manner during its entire history than Turkey. The Armenian successes would therefore also give an extra boost to Iran's political prestige – something which is barley desirable for Turkey." 108
In response to all these different factors which formed the Turkish foreign policy, Turkey never established any diplomatic relations with Armenia. Instead they put "Armenia's explicit abandoning of the territorial claims towards Turkey, demands about a recognition of Turkey's responsibility in the so-called genocide of the Armenians and a solution of the Karabakh conflict" as terms for establishing diplomatic relations. 109
Thereby, all of the assumption for a realisation of the foreign policy of HHSh and Ter-Petrosian towards Turkey were based on unrealistic grounds. But Ter-Petrosian continued to pursue this policy despite the fact that the then Turkish president, Turgunt Özal, on March 6, 1992, had stated that "in regard to Karabakh it is necessary to scare the Armenians some." Özal also sent several Turkish officers in order to act as advisors and train the Azerbaijani army and he also sent 50,000 soldiers to the Armenian border. 111 When the Armenians captured the city of -Shushi, Özal threatened to intervene military. However, this challenge was quickly responded by Marshal Evgenij Shaposhnikov, the supreme commander of the CIS (Commonwealth of the Independent States). He warned that such actions could lead to a third world war. 112 Any how, just before his death in April 1993, in an obvious remark to the 1915 Genocide, Özal stated that: "Armenia has not learned its lesson from its experience in Anatolia and the punishment which it resulted in." 113
In defence of this policy, the immediate persons around the Ter-Petrosian administration used to point out the vital shipment of wheat which reached Armenia, through Turkey, during the harsh winter of 1992-1993, while they disregarded Turkey's blockade of the country. What they left out was that Ankara forced the civil Armenian aircrafts down on Turkish soil and delayed the humanitarian aid for several months. 114 They also did not mention the financial details around this issue: "After many Byzantine tactics and several months of delay, Turkey finally agreed to send the 100,000 tons of wheat which the European community had promised to replace. After having humiliated the entire population of Armenia in bread queues, Turkey finally began to ship the wheat across the border in a very slow pace and to an extremely high price. The transport of wheat, all the way form Russia to Armenia, cost only two dollars per ton, payable in deprecated roubles. Turkey charged $56 per ton in hard currency. Armenia was forced to empty its reserves of foreign currency in order to avoid a bread riot." 115
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