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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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During the two weeks prior to the important press conference of Ter-Petrosian on September 26, 1997, one began to see indications of that certain things were about to happen. On September 12, 1997, the defence minister of the self proclaimed Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, Samvel Babayan, gave an unusual interview to Noyan Tapan news agency. Babayan stated that "If we do not manage to reach a result at the negotiation table, then the risk for war increases." He added that "We are ready to do that" and demanded direct negotiations with Baku. In answer to the question about returning the occupied territories, which were being held by Karabakh's army, to Azerbaijan, Babayan made it clear that no one would even think such a possibility before there had been an agreement reached regarding the status of the none-recognised republic. As far as it concerned the territories which linked Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia, the defence minister argued that even if Karabakh would be granted its independence "today", the Latchin and Kelbajar will never be returned. He also accused the international mediators for being part partial and for taking Azerbaijan's side and warned Azerbaijan that no one will serve Karabakh to them on a silver plate. As conclusion he suggested that Azerbaijan, after the loss of one or two additional districts, might be more willing to make concessions. 183

These were quite bizarre statements at a time when an outbreak of war was quite unthinkable. Apparently Babayan wanted to indicate that the involved parties in the Karabakh negotiations – Armenia, Azerbaijan and OSCE "Minsk group" – would have realised that any peace agreement at all would demand the direct involvement of the government of Karabakh in the negotiations and the consent of Stepanakert to an eventual action plan.

On the same day, the newly elected president of Karabakh, Arkadi Ghoukasian, in a news paper interview, stated that the proposition was equivalent with submission to the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, since in the first step they would return Aghdam, Kelbajar, Latchin and even -Shushi. According to him Baku was planning to shatter Karabakh in two pieces and thereby creating a new Cyprus: one region with two different ethnical administrations. He also claimed that, while this solved the problem with the Azerbaijani refugees, it in no way solved the problem with the 500,000 Armenian refugees. Karabakh was expected, despite the victory, to surrender.

It is with these factors as background that one should regard the press conference of Ter-Petrosian. 186 Ter-Petrosian defined five different possible alternatives as an agreement in the Karabakh conflict. The first were about maintaining the present situation, i.e. Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani areas, hundred of thousands Azerbaijani refugees who lived in camps, the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and continuous international pressure on Armenia. He discarded this alternative since it would lead to the loss of "everything we have achieved until now". He argued that this had happened in Serbia and they might be able to hold the situation in its present form in maximum another year or two before the international community lost its patience. He also discarded the alternative of recognising Karabakh as a complete independent nation or its annexation to Armenia. Such an action would be regarded as an ultimatum to Azerbaijan and the world (the majority of the major powers, and specially France and Russia would not like to have such an example to serve as a pattern for Corsica or Chechnya). He also discarded the alternative of a renewed war where Karabakh would force Azerbaijan to give up the region. In order to do this, they had to conquer Baku and its oil fields, something which the international community would not allow. Moreover, Ter-Petrosian meant that the longer the conflict was going on, the more Armenia and Karabakh would grow weaker by the existing embargos and the blockades, at the same time that the country lost incomes because of the economical possibilities from the oil in the Caspian Sea. During the same time, Azerbaijan, thanks to the same oil, would build up its military power.