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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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Hajinsky and Rasul-Zade were not the only Moslems to confer with Halil Bey. From Baku, Elisavetpol, Akhalkalak, Akhaltsikh, and other areas of the Caucasus, messengers and deputations were received in Batum. Each, warning that the Moslems of Transcaucasia were threatened with destruction, pleaded for Turkish assistance. Using the principle of self-determination, the Turkic plurality of the Caucasus begged for an Ottoman foremarch. Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh residents petitioned for direct annexation to the Ottoman Empire, while supplicants from other districts simply called for liberation and made no specific proposal concerning the final disposition of their native provinces. 101 Such expressions reinforced Enver's conviction that the golden opportunity was at hand.

Three days after von Lossow's proposal, Jemal Pasha, Minister of the Marine and junior member of the Ittihad Triumvirate, arrived in Batum to confer with the delegations. Meeting with the Transcaucasians, he warmly greeted the Georgians and Tatars but, turning toward Khatisian, coldly remarked that Armeno-Turkish animosity was of long standing and that the Armenians were unfortunately doing nothing to rectify the situation. He castigated Andranik and other partisan "bandits" who were slaughtering the peaceful Moslem population and denounced the Armenians of Baku for joining with the Bolsheviks to spill the blood of thousands of his coreligionists. 102 Two days after this scene, von Lossow informed the Transcaucasian delegation that Halil had refused to permit mediation. 103 Possibly Jemal had made the decision. In either event, it was consistent with Turkish objectives. Allowing Germany to intervene would only complicate and prolong the conference, which Turkey desired to conclude summarily. On the evening of May 25, Chkhenkeli received from von Lossow another communiqué, which startled some member of the delegation: "I have trustworthy information that the Transcaucasian Republic and government are in the process of disintegrating. Since this was not foreseen and because I have no instructions to continue negotiations after the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federation, as my liaison relates only to those matters concerning the Transcaucasian government, it is necessary for me to communicate with and personally receive new verbal instruction from the responsible German officials. Not to lose time, I have decided to leave Batum tonight on the German steamship, Minna Horn." 104 Obviously, von Lossow knew more about what was to occur in Tiflis on the following day than did several of Chkhenkeli's colleagues. Only the Georgians knew the destination of the "Minna Horn."

The full meaning of the Berman note had not yet become clear when on May 26, Halil Bey abruptly halted the informal talks. In the ultimatum he delivered to Chkhenkeli, Halil expressed sorrow that, although negotiations had been in progress for over two weeks, no accord had been reached. He continued: "Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Moslems in Baku and its environs are suffering under the bloody yoke of heartless bandits, so-called revolutionaries, and the irreparable tragedy which threatens those unfortunates becomes more and more inevitable." 105 Likewise, Moslems throughout the remainder of the Caucasus were subjected to every imaginable type of criminal activity. No government could witness these atrocities with indifference, especially when the holocaust engulfed a religiously and racially related people in neighbouring lands. Because of these considerations and because of the exigencies of war demanded immediate utilisation of the Transcaucasian railways, the Ottoman Empire now requested a definite answer regarding its terms of May 11 "as well as the new proposal pertaining to rectification of the boundaries, the text of which I have the honour to present herewith." Unconditional acceptance within seventy-two hours would alone guarantee a friendly settlement between the two governments. In the meantime, satisfactory relations would be maintained only if "the Turkish military activity in the south o the Caucasus meets with no resistance." 106 The boundary rectification to which Halil referred was a demand for even more territory. The Ottoman Empire would exact additional areas of the Alexandropol and Etchmiadzin uezds, nearly half of the Yerevan and Sharur-Daralagiaz uezds, and, except for a small district around Ordubad, the entire Nakhichevan uezd. With ultimatum in hand, the Transcaucasians prepared to depart for Tiflis. 107