The English policy regarding Armenia was indeed not characterised by the indifference nor the deception as others claimed it to be. This sprang partly from the fact that the English rule has always encompassed differences of opinion: Emerson described the English people thus: "Among its best features is its extreme duality, which at the same time has created one of the most disciplined and practical nations in the world."
Despite the responsibility which England took upon itself through its Eastern policy from the beginning of the 19th century onwards, including the signing of the Cyprus Treaty , that nation's reaction to the events in Armenia and the Ottoman Empire cast noble reflections on the political life of that country. Baxton writes, "it was the Ottoman question alone, which in 1880 forced in a new government in England. And again it was the Armenian Question which in 1896 created a divide within the Labour Party and forced Earl Roseberry to resign as its leader. The final great speeches of Gladstone were aimed at demanding the intervention of the English government to the advantage of the Armenians. To the end of his days, Gladstone called for new co-operators on the Armenian Question." 273
Only the cooperation of England and Russia could have solved the Armenian Question comprehensively. However, the competition between England and Russia, which characterised most of the 19th century, had a negative aspect, and Armenia was one, if not the most unfortunate, of its victims. 274
As a Russian historian remarks: "If the Armenian massacres aroused the wrath and the hate of Europe, then it also revealed the cruel hypocrisy in international relations. England exerted itself equally in the implementation of the reforms in Armenia as it had done for the Slavic nations in the Balkans during the tyranny of the Turks, peoples who were liberated due to the efforts of Russia. Russia displayed a very feeble support for England's defence of the Armenians and with its policy of non-intervention prevented the implementation of the reforms in Armenia. The reason for these two contradictory actions was that, in the game of chess between England and Russia over the map of the Orient, Armenia was nothing more than a pawn." 275
Thus intervention in the Armenian Question, and in its counterpart Macedonia, was prevented because of the competition between Russia and England and the indifference and self-interest of the other major powers, an intervention which was desperately necessary to bring to an end the unbearable situation in Armenia. 276
The indifference of the major powers in the case of Macedonia resulted in grave consequences; indeed Europe, afraid of eventual complications, refused to carry out a small but necessary intervention which would end the unbearable situation caused by the Berlin Treaty, let this small flame set the whole continent on fire. It was this unsolved question in Macedonia which caused the wars in the Balkans of 1912-1913, which preluded the 1914 catastrophe. It was at this moment that the defenders of the Armenian Question, men such as Paul Cambon, Georges Clemenceau, Jean Jaurès, Francis De Pressense, Ernst Lavis, and Albert Vandal , with admirable vision 277 proclaimed that such an indifferent and passive policy could only lead to a major catastrophe. Francis De Pressense commented: "I am more afraid that this neutral policy will one day draw us into a war, a war which surely will not be small." 278
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