The most overpowering rhetorician that evening was Lev Tumanov, representing the non-Georgian members of the small Social Revolutionary fraction. Point by point he exposed the inconsistency and hypocrisy of the lesser Menshevik spokesmen. Tumanov demanded that the Seim at least be honest with itself and admit that the question of independence had been placed on the agenda to comply with the demand of Turkish imperialism. What party in the Seim had ever campaigned on the platform of separation from Russia? The Mensheviks had attempted to justify the act by resorting to the claim of self-determination. Certainly, Tumanov cried, self-determination was an excellent basis. What more neutral way was there to determine the people's will than to conduct a referendum? Was there doubt in anyone's mind what the popular verdict would be? Then, addressing the Musavat fraction, the tempestuous orator belittled the statement of Mehmed Emin Rasul-Zade that "conscience and not fear" was the motivation for independence. The truth was that "fear and not conscience" was prodding the Seim toward that disastrous decision. If the legislature, as was obvious, had resolved to take the step, it should at least refrain from mentioning the "will of the people," for that will remained directed toward Russia. In conclusion, Tumanov exclaimed that the Russian orientation was a revolutionary and not Bolshevik orientation, whereas independence under the existing conditions would mean slavery to Turkey. The time would come when Transcaucasia would sorely regret the already determined strategy of the leading fractions. 13
Ivan Lordkipanidze, speaking for the Georgian Social Revolutionaries, differed with his colleague. Russia had not come to the assistance of Transcaucasia, which now was compelled to fend for herself. As a sovereign state, Transcaucasia could negotiate with all of the Central Powers and could be assured that Germany would not permit its Turkish ally to hold Batum and Baku permanently. Even if enemy occupation could not be avoided, existence as a separate state was advantageous, for at the conference table Transcaucasia would have the international rights of a defeated nation. 14
Iuly Semenov, as a Russian Kadet, naturally sided with Tumanov. His prediction proved accurate: "After declaring independence, the second step will be to negotiate with Turkey about signing an alliance and you will be compelled step by step to do that which you are ordered by the Turks… You will go to the aid of the Turkish troops send to conquer Baku, and when the Turkish forces pass over Transcaucasia, there will take place the conquest of Transcaucasia by the Turco-Germanic union." 15 Oniashvili, more animated and expressive than on his first appearance, took the podium again to lash out at Semenov. Did the Russian delegate possibly have a Kadet division that would defend Transcaucasia? The fact was that all the Semenovs would race toward Vladikavkaz and beyond the Caucasus when tragedy struck, but the Georgians and the other indigenous peoples had nowhere to flee. 16
At long last, after the loquacity of all other fractions had been expended, the silence of Dashnaktsoutiun was broken. Hovhannes Kachaznouni stood before the Seim. The brevity and pungency of his single sentence left no doubt about the true feelings of his party and his people: "Citizens, members of the Seim, the fraction Dashnaktsoutiun, clearly cognizant of that great responsibility which it takes upon itself at this historic moments, joins in favour of declaring a separate Transcaucasian government." 17 The speaker returned to Dashnaktsoutiun's benches, some member of which had left the assembly to avoid voting in favour of the motion proposed by Oniashvili: "The Transcaucasian Seim resolves to proclaim Transcaucasia an independent democratic federative republic." 18 Only a handful of ballots was cast in opposition, but, unfortunately, events of the following month were to demonstrate that Transcaucasia was not independent, democratic, federative, or a republic.
During this same April 22 session, Chkhenkeli reported on the Trabizond Conference. With shrewdness and tact, he explained that the refusal of the Transcaucasian Moslems to take up arms against Turkey should be viewed objectively. It was as impossible for them to engage in hostilities as it would be for the Christians to turn their weapons against Russia. 19 Having heard Chkhenkeli's account the Seim requested its Presidium to seek means to renew the peace talks and at the same time to defend Transcaucasia. So that parleys could continue, however, it was imperative that Gegechkori's "cabinet of war" bow to a "cabinet of peace." The natural choice to head such a body was Akaky Chkhenkeli, who was delegated to form a new government. Some members of the legislature suggested that the Gegechkori-Ramishvili-Karjikian extraordinary collegium should retain authority until Chkhenkeli's cabinet had received Seim approval, but Gegechkori, feeling that his policy had been thoroughly discredited, refused to continue in office. 20 Thus, from April 23 to April 26, the day the Seim confirmed Chkhenkeli's cabinet, there was no official government in Transcaucasia. This fact could be easily omitted were it not for the momentous events that occurred during the three-day interval.
|
