The matter dragged on until January 27, when Gegechkori warned the Commissariat that its long silence could be interpreted by Turkey as a negative response to suggestions for friendship. He now proposed to reply to Vehib that, although Transcaucasia was appreciative of Turkey's concern, a definitive answer would be postponed until the governments of the Ukraine and South Russia had been consulted. 68 On the following day, this course of action was confirmed in a joint session of the Commissariat, the Army Command, and political leaders. During heated debates, Chkhenkeli opposed inviting the Ukraine, for that government already was conducting separate negotiations with the Central Powers. Furthermore, should there be renewed hostilities with Turkey, only Transcaucasia and possibly North Caucasus neighbours would be involved. However, the Armenian spokesmen, the military representatives, and most of the Mensheviks, clinging to the Russian orientation, attempted to coordinate Transcaucasia's activities with those of as much of the former Empire as possible. Karjikian called attention to the important Ukrainian naval role on the Black Sea in the event of a Turkish offensive, while Kadet-Populist Papadjanian insisted that even the Bolsheviks be invited to confer. 69 Chkhenkeli was overruled, and Commissariat President Gegechkori wired the Central Ukrainian Rada at Kiev and the South-East Union at Yekaterinodar, inviting both governments to confer at Tiflis in mid-February. 70 Gegechkori also notified the dean of foreign representatives in Tiflis, Luigi Villari, and asked that the Allied and neutral nations be informed of the Commissariat's decision. 71 Finally, on January 28, two weeks after having received Vehib's message, the Tiflis rulers responded through General Odishelidze, thanking the Ottomans for the "humanitarian desire to cease hostilities as soon as possible and to establish peace between the two sides" but requesting a three-week delay for a definite answer. 72
Even before receipt of this inconclusive reply, Vehib wrote again, inviting the Commissariat to send delegates to Brest-Litovsk, where the Central Powers would spare no effort to obtain recognition of the Transcaucasian government. 73 The German scholar Jäschke maintains that the Commissariat committed a fatal blunder by rejecting the offer. The Ukraine, with representatives at Brest-Litovsk, was recognised by the Central Powers, which then coerced the Sovnarkom to accept the independence of that border region. 74 In February, 1918, however, the Armenian-Georgian socialist bloc should not have been expected to condone the "treacherous" Brest negotiations, which, after all, had been initiated without Constituent Assembly approval and were intended to crush the Russian democracy. Only the Georgian National Democrats accepted and approved the fact that Transcaucasia's future no longer was associated with the fate of Russia but depended on the benevolence of the Central Powers. 75
On the day appointed for the conference of the Russian border regions, February 14, no delegates arrived from Kiev or Yekaterinodar. Earlier, the South-East Union had approved the idea but implied inability to participate because of communication and transportation problems, but the Ukrainian Rada had not even acknowledged Gegechkori's summons. 76 Anger and annoyance were shown by the Commissariat, the Soviet Regional Centre, military officials, and invited leaders who met on the fourteenth to consider the situation. Papadjanian argued that there was no longer any cause to delay negotiations with Turkey, while General E. V. Lebedinsky, having replaced Przhevalsky as Chief Commander of the Front, pointed out that the Ukraine, by having withdrawn its soldiers from the Caucasus, was obviously not interested in collaboration. Still concerned about Entente opinion, Ramishvili proposed informing the Allies that Transcaucasia, with the intention of guaranteeing the inviolability of the demarcation lines established by the Erzinjan Truce, would enter negotiations with Turkey. At last it was resolved that the Seim, the legislative body still in the process of formation, would determine the bases for peace. In the interim, a special commission would prepare suggestions and the Commissariat would arrange with the Ottoman government for the time and place of negotiations. Gegechkori relayed this information to Constantinople. 77 The rather abrupt volt face of the Tiflis policy-maker was linked directly to the alarming dispatches from the front.
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