The views of the Commissar for Nationalities were not so dichotomous. Bluntly criticising the borderlands for severing their bonds with Soviet Russia, Stalin contended: "All this points to the necessity of interpreting the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination, no of bourgeoisie, but of the working masses of the given nation. The principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the principles of socialism." 7
His views could not be misconstrued when he declared, "So, the interests of the peoples masses dictate that the demand for secession of the border regions at this stage of the revolution is profoundly counter-revolutionary." 8 With no qualms, the Commissar championed the cleavage of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and other colonies from the European imperialists but steadfastly rejected the separation of the Russian border provinces. The first would bring liberation from oppression, whereas the latter would result in capitalistic enslavement. 9
It is clear that Bolshevik success stemmed partly from the sagacity to adapt to the psychology of the people. In 1917-1918 the masses cried not only for peace and bread, but also for scarcely understood right of self-determination. Carried to the extreme, that principle could have led to the complete dissolution of the Empire, so painstakingly pieced together during the preceding centuries. By making the right of self-determination contingent upon what would benefit "the working masses," however, the Sovnarkom had contrived a formula that allowed for proclaiming democratic ideals while resisting separatism. "Voluntary union" was the Leninist motto, but most non-Russians were not captivated by the phrase. Stalin later found it necessary to admit that the Soviet government had been incapable of counteracting "the inevitable process of temporary disintegration." 10
The Armenian interpretation of self-determination was quite clear – regional autonomy for Transcaucasia and national-territory autonomy for Western (Turkish) Armenia. The most recent modification of these gradually developed concepts was the widespread conviction that the latter should not, in any way, revert to Ottoman suzerainty. The Provisional Government's administrative arrangement for Western Armenia indicated that the despised Ottoman would never again be permitted to set foot on the Plateau. The November Revolution thus compelled Armenians on both sides of the 1914 borders to appraise nationality policies of the Bolsheviks. Naturally, there was no Armenian proclivity toward independence, for separation under the existing conditions was equivalent to self-destruction. Only in a federated Russia could the provincial boundaries of Transcaucasia be redrawn to correspond to the Armenian notion of self-determination. More important, only with the protection of powerful, united Russia could the fruit of victory in Western Armenia be retained and autonomy assured. Consequently, the leading Armenian political currents were permeated with scepticism toward certain Bolshevik declarations, especially those which, in the name of self-determination, demanded Russian evacuation of the occupied portions of Persia and the Ottoman Empire.
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