German suspicion of the Turks was intensified by new reports form von Lossow. On May 23 he again charged that Enver and Talaat were bent on exterminating all remaining Armenians and on annexing not only much of the Yerevan and Tiflis guberniias but also Elisavetpol and Baku. They were scheming to confront Germany with a fait accompli. Von Lossow requested that a warship and a German battalion be dispatched to Transcaucasia to counteract this plot. Two days later he warned that Turkish eyes were upon the entire Caucasus and even the lands to the north. Turkey's respect for its senior ally could be restored only through a show of force. 89 Thoroughly alarmed, the German High Command had already appointed Colonel Kress von Kressenstein (von Kress) to head a military mission to Tiflis. Von Kress, elevated to the rank of general while serving in Transcaucasia, was quite experienced in dealing with the Turks and might succeed in upholding German interests. Enver reacted violently to the German line of action. On May 20, the Ottoman War Minister warned Berlin that all Transcaucasia was threatened by Bolshevism, and he bewailed the suffering of innocent Moslems at the hands of the vicious Armenians. A week later, through his Chief of Staff, Enver claimed that three hundred thousand men in Transcaucasia were ready and waiting to join the Turkish Army. This vast reserve would be of great assistance to the Central Powers in the difficult task ahead. 90 Despite this assurance, Enver Pasha failed to allay the misgivings of the German strategists.
Economic as well as political factors influenced the shaping of the Kaiser's Transcaucasian policy. Three years of warfare had depleted Germany's raw materials, and the Caucasus was an untapped reservoir that could be gainfully exploited. Both Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg have testified to German dependence on oil, copper, manganese, and cotton from this region. Ludendorff tried to justify the establishment of German control over part of Transcaucasia: "We acquired a means to get at the raw materials of the Caucasus, independently to Turkey, and to gain influence over the operation of the railway over Tiflis. This was of decisive importance for the conduct of war in North Persia and under a management influenced by Germany was more efficient than one in which the Turks would collaborate." 91 Supporting the military in this endeavour, the German Foreign Ministry even pondered means of depriving Turkey of Batum. German control of Batum, the terminus of the oil pipeline from Baku and the finest port of Transcaucasia, would greatly expedite the export of the raw materials to Europe. 92
Economic considerations also affected Germany's relations with Sovnarkom. Secret negotiations were in progress for a Caucasus settlement. Germany was plying Russia for recognition of a separate Transcaucasia, while the Sovnarkom strove to cling at least to Baku. Though full agreement was not reached until the end of August, 1918, the general provisions had already been formulated by the beginning of summer. Germany would permit Soviet Russia to retain the Baku region in return for a share of the oil and unlimited control over part of western Transcaucasia. Ottoman dominion in Caucasia naturally would abort the scheme. Aside from this consideration, Turkish seizure of Baku could provoke Russia into resuming hostilities on grounds that the action had nullified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Berlin did not cherish this prospect.
If Russia were to acknowledge German interests in western Transcaucasia, it would be necessary for the Sovnarkom to arrive at a modus vivendi with the Tiflis government and to assent, directly or indirectly, to coexistence. Soon after arriving in Moscow, Count von Mirbach initiated steps for a rapprochement by suggesting German mediation. Though claiming that Transcaucasia was still legally Russian territory and protesting the Batum negotiations without Sovnarkom participation, Chicherin accepted the offer on May 13. 93 Von Mirbach informed the Foreign Commissar on May 22 that a certain Machabeli would represent Chkhenkeli's government during the conference. Kiev was suggested as the site for the parleys, because talks of a similar nature between Ukrainian, Russian, and German deputies were already in progress there. The next day, Chicherin reiterated agreement to confer but cautioned that Soviet participation did not presuppose recognition of the so-called Transcaucasian government. 94 Whether the talks would have taken place and an understanding would have been reached remains a moot question, for three days later the "so-called Transcaucasian government" was no government at all.
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