Though the Ottoman action should not have been unexpected, the Transcaucasian delegation was unprepared to cop with the situation. The Tatars called for immediate acquiescence, but Georgian and Armenian members maintained that only the Tiflis government could act on such a momentous question. Nonetheless, most of the delegates, including Hovhannes Kachaznouni, had accepted the inevitability of bowing before the Turkish demand if the rest of Transcaucasia were to be saved. 91 Chkhenkeli wired the Seim to obtain permission to relinquish most of the Artvin okrug of the Batum oblast and the entire Kars oblast except for a minor border adjustment in favour of Transcaucasia. In pursuance of the Seim's fourth condition for peace, amnesty and permission for the refugees to repatriate were, according to Chkhenkeli, the maximum that could be expected from the Ottomans. He added pessimistically that even these concessions would probably be rejected and that it was therefore necessary to plan either on accepting the Brest provisions in toto or on breaking off the talks and declaring war. 92
Responding on April 8, the Tiflis government sanctioned Chkhenkeli's maximum concessions but noted that Dashnaktsoutiun demanded the inclusion of the Kars fortress in the strip of territory marked for the "border adjustment." No mention was made of complete acquiescence to the Brest terms or of the possibility of resuming the war. 93 By this time the last dissenter, Alexander Khatisian, appraising the despised Brest-Litovsk treaty as less disastrous than Transcaucasia's latest concession, advised immediate acceptance of the Turkish ultimatum. After all, Article IV of Brest-Litovsk had not authorised the outright annexation of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum but had stipulated that the inhabitants, with the cooperation of neighbouring governments, particularly Turkey, would determine the political future of the provinces. Yet now Transcaucasia was condoning direct Ottoman annexation of almost the entire region. Khalil Bek Khas-Mamedov was pleased that the delegation was at last unanimous. He reminded his colleagues that the incessant Turkish advance was not an invasion but was simply enforcement of the Brest-Litovsk supplementary agreement aimed at clearing the region of "armed bands." 94 The bands to which Khas-Mamedov referred were the military forces of the Transcaucasian government.
When Ottoman units pushed into Olti and Merdenek and along the Black Sea coast into the Batum oblast, Commissariat President Gegechkori instructed Chkhenkeli to protest the outrageous policy of engaging in hostilities while negotiations were in progress. Recognising that, from the Turkish viewpoint, this tactic was neither contradictory nor illegal, Chkhenkeli begged his government to assent to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Only then might the Ottomans allow certain rectifications along the new international boundary. 95 In a separate wire, Khatisian and Kachaznouni joined their chairman to urge the Seim and especially the Dashnakist fraction to respond favourably to the Turkish ultimatum. 96 On April 9, in a private interview, Chkhenkeli apprised Rauf of the Seim's maximum concessions, but the Ottoman leader was not content with nearly the entire Kars oblast and half of Batum. Instead, on the following evening, his secretary called on Chkhenkeli to receive Transcaucasia's final decision. 97 Waiting no longer for confirmation from Tiflis, Chkhenkeli notified Rauf that all further negotiations would be based on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Realising, however, that the presence of Turkey's allies would engender an atmosphere of restraint, he requested that all Central Powers now participate in the talks. Rauf coyly replied that such a step could not be seriously contemplated until Transcaucasia had officially declared independence. 98
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