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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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We have mentioned why Russia, from 1881 onwards, began to pursue an anti-Armenian policy; in the next chapter, we will describe the consequences of this policy on Russian domestic issues.

The hostility which the Russian government displayed towards the Armenians, was undoubtedly one of the factors leading to the horrible massacres of the Armenians, since as this hostility encouraged Sultan Abdul Hamid II to continue his resistance against the European major powers regarding the implementation of reforms. The assurance of the neutrality of Russia, and in some extent its attitude, gave the sultan the boldness to begin the massacres. Moreover, throughout the massacres, the Ottoman government enjoyed the solid support of the Russia, whose policy was to delay an intervention from the major powers in this matter. 2307420

Rambaud writes: "Only Russia could make an effective intervention in Western Armenia. But from 1895 and forward, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, the foreign minister of Russia, opposed all possible plans for establishing an independent Armenian province in Asia, which later could constitute the core of an independent Armenia." 231

In defiance of the views of the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Nelidof, who with his French colleague, Paul Cambon, was constantly demanding firm intervention from the European major powers, Lobanov-Rostovsky opposed every kind of pressure on the sultan. From May, 1895 onwards, Lobanov-Rostovsky held to his statement to the British ambassador in St Petersburg: "If the European powers insist on implementing the reforms, they will take upon themselves a great responsibility." 232 Ernst Lavis adds that the Russian foreign minister "had decided to let them (the Turks) to do whatever they wished to do, in other words, let them murder." During the course of the massacres and after their end, he stubbornly continued to oppose any kind of intervention. 233

The position of the Russian government in this question was not at all based on a benevolent desire for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Russia in fact had plans to take over Constantinople and Western Armenia, and was biding its time. As Francis Pre Samre observes: "Russia had given up its plans for consuming the Ottoman Empire bit by bit, hoping instead that some day, it could have the whole empire on its plate." The devastation of the Armenian population through massacre carried out by the Ottoman Empire was not what Lobanov-Rostovsky had in mind; rather his goal, according to a statement attributed to him, was to "obtain Armenia for Russia with the existence of the Armenians themselves." 235

Moreover, at this time, Russia had spent all its energy on expanding towards the Far East, keen to conquer Manchuria and Port Arthur. Therefore, Russia wanted to postpone a settling of accounts with the Ottoman Empire, and preserve its forces for an eventual resistance against the other major powers. 236

Finally, the final Russian Tsars and their disintegrating regime had come to the conclusion that all involvement in the affairs of a tyrannical sultan and a crowned thief such as Abdul Hamid II, would be a dangerous exploitation of the basics of ruling and the monarchy.