On May 16, at his new headquarters in Gharakilisa, General Nazarbekian received a second Turkish ultimatum, this time to permit the unhindered movement of Ottoman forces toward Joulfa: "If you will ensure the security of the movement along the route, then you can be assured that this movement will be conducted honourably by us, but if you oppose us we will advance on foot and be unable to guarantee the inviolability of the population." 75 One hour was given for a reply. Nazarbekian answered that, although only the Transcaucasian government could authorise the concession, he would, because of the time limit, take the responsibility upon himself to accept in principle the Turkish terms until final approval could arrive from Tiflis. He requested that all military activated cease at least until his government could make a decision. 76 Shevki and Karabekir did not wait. The Third Army's 5th, 9th, 11th, and 36th Caucasian divisions advanced on Hamamlu and Sardarabad. Capturing Hamamlu by May 22, the invaders blocked the communication and transportation routes between Tiflis and Yerevan. Then, dividing their forces, the Ottomans pressed toward Gharakilisa, approximately 120 kilometres from Tiflis, and toward Bash Aparan, 40 kilometres from Yerevan. 77
In Batum, Chkhenkeli protested the truce violations to Halil. The Turkish negotiator was reminded that even in his astonishing night-time note of May 14-15 he had made no demand for the evacuation of Alexandropol or the 25-kilometer withdrawal. Furthermore, Halil had promised a "strictly friendly and very reserved advance." What was occurring in the Yerevan guberniia was neither friendly nor reserved. Vindicating the Ottoman moves, Halil Bey replied that World War exigencies made use of the railway imperative. He feigned complete ignorance of the military activities that had taken place away from the Alexandropol-Joulfa line. 78
On May 18 Karjikian, chairman of the Seim's Dashnakist fraction, wired Khatisian and Kachaznouni instructions to try to gain German supervision over the railway and the retention of Armenian troops in the surrounding territory. If these conditions were accepted, the distraught inhabitants would be informed that their safety had been guaranteed and that there was no need to flee. 79 The presence of General von Lossow and several other German officials in Batum made intercession more likely.
|
