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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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To execute Chkhenkeli's directive, Colonel Morel was sent once again to Karabekir's camp, but efforts to obtain liberal terms for the evacuation were futile. The confident Turks, not in a tractable mood, demanded the following:


  1. clearing of the forts on the left bank of the Kars River by noon, Constantinople time, on the following day, April 25;
  2. evacuation of the remaining forts and the city by nightfall, April 25;
  3. withdrawal of all Transcaucasian armed units beyond the Arpa-chai River [the Brest boundary] by April 25. 32


Morel begged for an extension of several days so that the thousands of civilians who wanted to leave could be assisted and the retreat could be orderly. Karabekir rejected the appeal. After learning that the Tiflis government had sent Nazarbekian a new message ordering him not to prohibit the abandonment of Kars, Morel quickly accepted the Turkish conditions. 33

This puzzling episode, with Chkhenkeli in Tiflis, Vehib at his new headquarters in Batum, Nazarbekian at Alexandropol, Deev in Kars, Morel and Karabekir at the Turkish I Corps headquarters, finally reached a climax on April 25. Vehib must have been amused that day by Chkhenkeli's communiqué, which made the following requests:


  1. to withdraw Turkish troops from the occupied territories in the Kutais and Tiflis guberniias at the same time that Transcaucasian forces cleared Kars;
  2. to give at least seven days to evacuate the Kars oblast;
  3. to allow two to three days to clear the fortress itself;
  4. to grant a full month for the complete transferral of material from Kars to beyond the new boundaries;
  5. to accede to the withdrawal of all governmental, railway, sanitary, and engineering supplies;
  6. to consent to Transcaucasian control of the railway to Alexandropol during the period of evacuation;
  7. to prohibit plundering by the Kurds. 34


By the time Vehib received this appeal, the routes to Alexandropol were clogged with Christian refugees, the Armenian units were disorganised, and Kars was in flames. On the evening of April 25, the first Turkish units entered the city and, on the following day, General Deev, Colonel Morel, Military Commissar Misha Arzoumanian, and several other officials formally delivered the city to Karabekir Bey. 35

Chkhenkeli's hope to save the rich stores of war material, food, and governmental supplies was short-lived. The calculated Turkish refutation of the original pledge to permit a full evacuation soon arrived in Tiflis. Vehib Pasha "sadly" informed Chkhenkeli and Odishelidze that Turkish troops had been fired upon when they had approached Kars after the cease-fire. Moreover, the Ottoman forces, having encountered victims for Armenian atrocities all the way from Erzinjan, feared for the safety of Moslems in Kars. When smoke was seen rising from the city, they marched to the rescue of the populace. Therefore Turkish occupation of the fortress must be classed as an act of war. As such, the agreement to allow evacuation of all material was no longer valid. The captured goods were now loot belonging to the Ottoman Army. 36 Vehib Pasha, an experienced soldier, realised that allowing the enemy to take thousands of weapons and trainloads of ammunition and military supplies from Kars would be a serious blunder.

As the refugees from the Kars oblast streamed across the Arpa-chai (Akhurian) River into the Yerevan guberniia, the military epilogue of the Kars calamity was consummated. The Tiflis government ordered Nazarbekian to explode all fortifications on the west bank of the Arpa-chai. The Armenian general begged that such action be delayed, for without those strongholds Alexandropol would stand defenceless. Only after Turks had clarified their intentions and had guaranteed that the river boundary would not be violated should Transcaucasia relinquish the west-bank forts. Chkhenkeli adamantly insisted on their immediate destruction, and on April 28 Nazarbekian complied, withdrawing his remaining units into the Yerevan guberniia. The enemy advance that he feared would follow near Alexandropol first occurred, however, to the south of Surmalu. When Chkhenkeli complained to Vehib about such violations, the Ottoman general replied that these minor infractions had been provoked by hostile Armenians. He assured the Transcaucasian Premier that Turkish troops would respect the international boundary. 37 The pledge was not respected.