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Index

Armenia

The Urartu Civilisation

Victory for Independence

Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne

Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids

The Acceptance of Christianity

Defending Christianity

Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty

Cilicia - the New Armenia

Armenia Under Turanian Rule

The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia

The Eastern Question

Russia in the Caucasus

The Armenian Question

Battle on Two Fronts

Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I

The First World War

The Resurrection of Armenia

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

Eastern Armenia

Western Armenia

"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)

"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)

The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia

Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917

Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)

War and Independence (April-May, 1918)

The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)

In conclusion

Soviet Armenia

The Second Independent Republic of Armenia

Epilogue

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The key principle of HHSh was summarized in one of these ideologies, namely that "the steps of the Armenian people must be in proportion to its strength". 68 The time had come that they would face the reality and deal with all of Armenia's neighbours, especially Turkey.

During the early period, the policy of HHSh was dominated by anti-imperialistic emotions. These feelings were aimed not only towards Soviet, but also towards the West. They claimed, among others, that the Russian army could easily conquer the entire Western Armenia after having defeated the Ottoman army at Sarighamish (at the end of December 1914 and early January 1915), but they simply chose not to. Instead, the Russian army deliberately stood by so that the massacres would be finished and that Western Armenia would be emptied of Armenians (except in Van) before they conquered the region. Even in Van, they claimed, the Russian army forced the Armenians to move to Russia in order to drive out the remaining Armenian population. 70 Similar to this, in another article which was published shortly after the attacks against the Armenian population in Baku in the mid January 1990, Ter-Petrosian argued that these events had destroyed the "illusion" of that USSR guarantied the security of Armenians. 71

Even the West received heavy criticism for its earlier failures in supporting Armenia during its critical moments. They pointed out the false promises which the European countries gave during the era of the first Armenian republic and criticised the naivety and the incompetence of that times ruling Dashnak leaders. Instead of using its limited force and establishing direct relations with the Kemalist Turks, the Dashnaks continued to expect the assistance from the European powers, especially after the signing of the Sevres Treaty on August 10, 1920. Such a blindness resulted in additional territorial loses and in particular since Nagorno Karabakh and Nakhichevan were annexed to the republic of Azerbaijan. The ruling party, HHSh, would not pursue such an illusion. Its policy would be realistic and pragmatic and, as Levon Ter-Petrosian stated in an interview shortly after the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia (May 20, 1990), its main goal would be the reunification of Nagorno Karabakh with Armenia. 73

But before one could achieve the best of what this "realistic and pragmatic policy" had to offer, namely normal relations with Turkey, one must handle the delicate issue of the Armenian Genocide and its consequences. It must also handle the fact that the Armenians, for the first time in 2 600 years of the Armenian history, no longer lived on 85 percent of their homeland. HHSh argued that, for the sake of the independence and for the establishment of the state, one must lay the Armenian Genocide aside from the political agenda of Armenia. Ter-Petrosian, president of the Armenia's Supreme Soviet by the time prior to the independence, argued against including such a clause regarding the genocide into the declaration of independence, since this would be wrong from a political as well as a diplomatic point of view. But a majority of the members did not agree with him on this issue. 131 members of the soviet voted to the including of such a clause in the declaration of the independence so that it would be clear that the Republic of Armenia would support an international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Only 25 members voted against. 75

But this approach by the Ter-Petrosian and his administration showed to lack any support at all, neither among Armenians nor, surprisingly enough, Turkey. Despite the existing tensions, Armenia tried to begin a reconciliation effort on the diplomatic level with Turkey, but received very little response. As answer to the mayor of Yerevan who had said that "at the same time that the existence of the Armenian Genocide is beyond all doubts, the Armenian people must also have the courage to examine its attitude at that period of time…" the French historian Julliard has answered: "A admirable courage of which the Turkish leaders could as well have been inspired. But even then, will President Turgunt Özal to kneel in order to ask the Armenians for forgiveness as Willy Brandt had the strength to do towards the Jews?" 94