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The German Offensive and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
Trotsky's strange maxim did not impress the German High Command. Within a week the German armies advanced along the entire front. All of European Russia and the North Caucasus were imperilled by the Berlin war machine. The Sovnarkom was unable to wage a "revolutionary war," and, on February 23, the Central Executive Committee received and accepted a German ultimatum dated two days earlier. The Armenians were affected by point 5: "Russia shall do everything in her power to guarantee a speedy and orderly return of the East Anatolian provinces to Turkey." 39
A more conventional diplomat, G. V. Chicherin, replaced the disillusioned Trotsky as Foreign Commissar and scurried to Brest with a new delegation to sign the peace. But where the demands of Enver's delegates had earlier been held to a minimum, the interlude of renewed hostilities now altered the situation. Immediately following Trotsky's "no war, no peace" speech, General von Ludendorff informed the Ottoman Chief of Staff, General Hans von Seeckt, that Germany would welcome a strong Turkish offensive against the Caucasus. 40 Thus when, on February 27, Enver Pasha directed Ismail Hakki, diplomatic envoy to Berlin and delegate at Brest-Litovsk, to demand the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in addition to the restoration of the eastern vilayets, Germany yielded to the insistence of her ally. 41 Furthermore, on March 1, von Seeckt informed the German High Command that Russia should be compelled to recognise the existence of a separate Transcaucasian state, to pledge non-intervention in the affairs of that nation, and to guarantee the right of self-determination to the Moslems of Kazan, Orenburg, Turkestan, and Bukhara. The Enver-Talaat regime requested the benevolent support of Berlin in these matters. 42
When Chicherin's delegation arrived at Brest, it waived discussion of details and offered to sign the peace without further ado. Any terms placed before the Soviet delegates would be signed, for this was not a voluntary but dictated settlement. By refusing to review the treaty, the Sovnarkom representatives wished to dramatise the compulsory character of the proceedings. Furthermore, only after reaching Brest-Litovsk did Chicherin learn of the last-minute Turkish demand for part of Transcaucasia. 43 Once again the Soviet delegation bowed before the reality that dictated peace at any price or else death to the newly established order. Nonetheless, when accepting the terms on March 3, 1918, the Russian delegation declared: "In the Caucasus, plainly violating the conditions of the ultimatum of 21 February drawn up by the German Government itself, and ignoring the real wishes of the population of the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum, Germany detaches these areas for the benefit of Turkey, whose armies had never conquered them." 44 With complete absence of pomp, the treaty was signed.
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39) John W. Wheeler-Bennet, "Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918" (London, 1038), p. 256. Slightly different translation in "Proceedings…", p. 176, and Judah L. Magnes, "Russia and Germany at Brest Litovsk: A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations" (New York, [1919]), pp. 154-155.
40) Carl Mühlmann, "Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkrieg" (Leipzig, [1940]), p. 194.
41) Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur osmanischen Aussenpolitik im Weltkriege", Die Welt des Islams, XXIII (bk. 1-2, 1941), p. 24.
42) Carl Mühlmann, "Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkrieg" (Leipzig, [1940]), p. 190.
43) G. V. Chicherin, "Stat'i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki" (Moscow, 1961), p. 26.
44) Jane Degras, ed., "Soviet Document on Foreign Policy, I, 1917-1924" (London, 1951), p. 49. Slightly different in "Proceedings…", p. 186.
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