Effects of the Campaign in Transcaucasia
Many Armenians were among the thousands of casualties suffered by the Russian Caucasus Army. The four volunteer units, impatient to face the Turks, participated in the fiercest battles from Olti to Sarighamish and Persian Azerbaijan. By the end of the campaign a third of the volunteers had been killed or wounded. 37 The Armenian combatants felt adequately rewarded, however, when service medals and certifications of commendation were showered upon their units by Russian officials and generals. 38 Public statements of praise printed in papers around the world strengthened the conviction of the Eastern Armenians that the future prosperity of the nation was dependant upon the success of the tsarist armies. The report between government and subjects was evidenced again during 1915 when the Armenians were authorised to organise three more volunteer groups, led by Vartan, Avsharian, and Arghoutian. 39 Though all units were subject officially to the general directives and strategy of the Russian Caucasus Army Command, immediate contact and orders emanated from the special Armenian committee in charge of volunteer activities. The Armenians were gaining administrative experience. Yet because the committee and its parent organisation, the National Bureau, were accused of complete subservience to the dictates of Dashnaktsoutiun, the sixth corps of the volunteers, composed primarily of Hntchakists and enlists from America and the Balkans, operated independently. 40 Though disputes among the various units and the respective commanders were numerous, all were united in their attitude toward the Ottoman government and Western Armenia.
The Russian victories of January, 1915, had averted the immediate threat to Transcaucasia, but the crisis had left is scars. Nearly seventy thousand Armenians uprooted from the battle zone had fled toward Yerevan and Tiflis. The influx of those refugees further aroused the Transcaucasian Armenians, who created numerous relief societies and solicited public contributions for the unfortunate victims. Originally, both natives and refugees believed that only temporary relief measures were necessary, for with the expected occupation of the entire Plateau by Russian troops the Armenians from the border area could return home to rebuild with confidence and security. 41
The effect of Sarighamish operation on the mutual relations of the Transcaucasian peoples was of a different nature. During the first days of the Turkish offensive, the loss of the entire region seemed imminent. Families of Russian officials evacuated to safer areas and governmental establishments prepared to withdraw to the North Caucasus. The Armenian populace was struck with horror, for little compassion was expected from Enver Pasha. 42 In the midst of the turmoil, Armenian, Moslem, and Georgian political leaders conferred in Tiflis. The Armenians advocated active popular resistance to the invaders and urged their Transcaucasian neighbours to organise militias. Although Moslem representatives professed loyalty to Russia, they remained noncommittal, while the Georgians overtly opposed the strategy suggested by Dashnaktsoutiun. Noi Ramishvili, an influential Social Democrat and future premier of Georgia, agreed to the formation of militia charged with maintaining law and order after the anticipated Russian evacuation but considered a defensive stand both illogical and impossible. The only way to save Transcaucasia from destruction was to welcome the Turks and to simulate submission to the conqueror. To allay Armenian misgivings, Ramishvili pointed out that Enver Pasha was German-trained and thus naturally imbued with the enlightened European attitudes toward the conduct of war. 43 Fortunately, the subsequent Turkish fiasco at Sarighamish permitted the Transcaucasians to evade the necessity of reaching a decision, but, significantly, the episode had exposed their fundamentally divergent concepts.
|