The policy that Tsar Nicholas II and his colleagues pursued took a line from a French conservative think tank (reminiscent of the liberal customs and traditions from the great bourgeois epoch of France), advice which undoubtedly could guide them in the Armenian Question: "When conservative policy reaches the level of fanaticism and when it freezes solid due to the lack of movement, then it alters its character and loses its point of view and direction. In that state, it can be more revolutionary than all other revolutionary policies, since it paves the path for expansion of exploitation and slowly, but surely, becomes unclear and, as a result, causes great catastrophes and horrible ramifications." 237
France, which had only a short time before emerged from a depression that had begun in 1870, and only through its alliance with Russia, adapted its position to suit its new ally. 238 Russia resented what it felt was ingratitude from the Christian peoples of the Balkans after its assistance in their liberation in the 19th century. France, too, whose government had contributed great assistance to the creation of these nations, had fallen victim of the alliance with Germany, and bemoaned the ungratefulness of Italy. During that period the French foreign ministry, upset with the successes of Bismarck, underwent a succession of crises; this, however, was brought to an end after a few years, when politicians such as Delcasse, Cambon and Barr 239 reinstated the old French customs and traditions.
In France, "they displayed the need for individual calculations, which until that was perhaps not obvious… but after a period of enervation, opposite to the general rule, the people went in the opposite direction and as compensation for the fact that they had ignored the profit at hand, now they no longer wished to have anything else than the immediate profit." 240
Despite the impact that these massacres had on the French public, the French foreign minister, Gabriell Hanoto, with the assistance of the media, curiously silent regarding the massacres in Armenia, pushed through a policy of non-intervention. 241
Critique of this policy regarding the real interests of France in the Orient was articulated brilliantly by contemporary politicians such as Georges Clemenceau, Jean Jaurès, Etiene Lami and Ernst Lavis. 242
The German government, loyal to Bismarck's policy, throughout this period defended the stubbornness of Sultan Abdul Hamid's refusal to implement the reforms, which England was simultaneously pushing for.
It is important to note that for a long time Wilhelm II, the German Kaiser, had been anxious to win the friendship of Turkey, both to secure a new region for the expansion of Germany's future economic activities, and to ensure an ally for the inevitable war against Russia.
Germany, therefore, led a hostile and aggressive policy against the Armenians and, like Russia, defended the theory of non-intervention. The negative reaction to this policy was great, not only among the German public, but also among many of the army commanders. 243 It did, however, receive the backing of the media, which were under the control of Bismarck. 244
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