In 1898, Wilhelm II even took the brazen step of breaching the circle of contempt surrounding the sultan (named by Clemenceau the "Red Sultan" and by Gladstone "the Great Murderer" ), visiting him. 254 Marshall von Waldesi recorded the visit in his memoirs: "The journey of the Kaiser to Constantinople is confirmation of the crimes which have been committed against the Armenians. This regrettable action will not bode well for us." 246
The action of Germany in the matter regarding the events in Armenia, according to Eduard Bernstein , displayed the lack of the advocacy of freedom in its foreign policy, which by that point characterised the policy of the other major European powers. 247 Of course, this very deficiency had regrettable consequences not only in Armenia, but also for the rest of the world and eventually Germany itself. The events of the 20th century gave the German rulers occasion to listen to Rewal, when he said: "The kind of person who has mean interests will always be deceived, for he is precluded from cleverness."
In Austria-Hungary, Goluchowski, who had succeeded Kalndy as foreign minister, shared the views of Lobanov-Rostovsky in wanting to rid himself of the Eastern Question. Goluchowski was very pleased that Russia was pursuing its expansion eastwards and appeared no longer to show any interest in the Ottoman Empire.
Whilst the power elite of Austria-Hungry expressed their sympathy for the victims of the massacres in Armenia, they saw them nonetheless as a necessary sacrifice for the peace in Europe. 250
During that period, Sultan Abdul Hamid worked continuously, through his underlings such as S. Whitman, Newlinsky and Vanbery, to buy consciences, collaborators and silence. 254 Through Whitman, the "Red Sultan" constantly received advice from Bismarck, who offered his vision and recommendations, both equally destructive. 256
Ottoman diplomacy, meanwhile, made optimum use of the failure of Europe, through its ignorance and misinformation, to unite, and followed the old Ottoman recipe of denial, negative answers and semblance of rights. 257
Let us review England's stance on the Armenian question. According to the items in the Cyprus treaty , and due to the unfair profit which England gained from this treaty and at the expense of the Armenians, "it had not only been the right thing to do, but also its responsibility to intervene in this matter." 258
England, however, was only prepared to intervene on the condition that the other European major powers also cooperate so that the necessary measures would be taken jointly.
When Lord Salisbury, the then prime minister of Great Britain, with support from Paul Cambon, the French ambassador at the Ottoman court, suggested that the major powers issue an official ultimatum to the sultan and decide on a deadline after which they would intervene militarily, the governments of St Petersburg, Berlin and Paris refrained, due to the reasons outlined above, from collaborating. 259
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