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War and Independence (April-May, 1918)
The Russian scholar and statesman, P. N. Miliukov, has characterised the 1917-1918 events in the region beyond the Caucasus Mountains as the "Balkanisation of Transcaucasia." This area, once a single unit within the Romanov Empire, first was wrenched from Russia and then, like the Balkans, was splintered into separate feuding districts, which some deigned to term "republics." 1 The process of division from Russia spanned the period from November, 1917, to April 1918. The second step, the partition of Transcaucasia, was to follow a month later. To both measures, the Armenians unwillingly acquiesced. Having for several months avoided declaring independence from Russia, Transcaucasia was finally driven to action by force of Turkish arms. In vain was the Chkhenkeli delegation recalled from Trabizond, for, within two weeks, Transcaucasia was thoroughly humbled. Announcing its independent status to comply with Ottoman demands, the Tiflis government meekly sent to Batum a new delegation to establish eternal peace and friendship with the Ittihadist rulers of Turkey. The failure of that mission introduced the final phase in the "Balkanisation of Transcaucasia."
War
When warfare officially resumed on April 14, the front no longer extended, as it had in February, from Trabizond to Erzinjan and Van. The Caucasus Army Command enjoined General Gabaev's Georgian troops to prevent Turkish entry into Batum and directed Nazarbekian's Corps to stand firm on the Engija-Novo-Selim-Tiknis positions west of Kars. Approximately six thousand Armenians manned that line and the Kars fortress, whose commander, General Deev, had at his disposal nearly a thousand cannons and heavy guns of various types. 2 Vehib Pasha, having transferred Third Army headquarters to Trabizond, threw the 37th Division of the II Corps against Batum and deployed twelve to fifteen thousand men from the 11th Division and from the I Corps' 9th and 36th divisions against the Armenian positions around Kars. At the same time, Enver Pasha augmented the Third Army reserves with several units from other fronts. 3
The Seim's rejection of the Turkish ultimatum delivered by Rauf Bey alarmed the Armenians of Tiflis, for news had filtered through that the Ottomans were already marching toward the Transcaucasian capital. Many, especially the refugees from Western Armenia, fled to the North Caucasus, while thousands of others prepared to follow if the enemy approached the city. The calm and unconcern of the Georgians stood out in sharp contrast to the trepidation of the Armenians. Zurab Avalov, a Georgian educator and statesman who was returning from Russia in April, 1918, noted: "Especially the Armenian population of Tiflis had reasons to fear the arrival of the Turks; many were already leaving toward the North, and we had met them along the Georgian Military Road…In spite of this situation, the Tiflis crowd, was unworried and full of joy…" 4
Though the Georgian politicians appealed for a united stand against the invader, most Georgians adhered to Chkhenkeli's views and were willing to allow maximal concessions to attain immediate peace. Even the enthusiasm of the Menshevik "war party" subsided rapidly on the evening of April 14, after Turkish troops, encountering only feeble resistance, had swept into Batum and captured the three thousand Georgian troops and six hundred officers in the garrison. 5 Less then twenty-four hours after resolving to fight until the last man had fallen, the Georgian leaders recognised the hopelessness of the situation.
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1) Paul Miliukov, "The Balkanization of Transcaucasia", The New Russia, II (June 24, July 1, July 8, 1920), 236-241, 269-274, 299-303.
2) Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference [now integrated into the archives of Dashnaktsoutyoun, Boston, Massachusetts], File 1406a/26a; General G. Korganoff, "La participation des Arméniens à la guerre mondiale sur le front du Caucase, 1914-1918" (Paris, 1927), p. 122; A. B. Kadishev, "Interventsiia I grazhdanskaia voina v Zakavkaz'e" (Moscow, 1960), p. 53.
3) Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference [now integrated into the archives of Dashnaktsoutyoun, Boston, Massachusetts], File 1/1. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921" (Cambridge, 1953), p. 470, state that the Turks had from 55,000 to 60,000 troops for the Caucasus campaign. The 37th and 5th Caucasian divisions of the II Corps were in the Batum-Olti area, while the Corps' 11th Division as well as the 9th, 10th, and 36th divisions of the I Corps were in the regions of Kars and Ardahan. Operating in the Diadin-Bayazid-North Persian sector were the 5th and 12th divisions of the IV Corps.
4) Z. Avalov, "Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike, 1918-1921 g.g." (Paris, 1924), p. 28, The author uses his Georgian name, Zourab Avalishvili, in the English translation, "The Independence Georgia in International Politics, 1918-1921".
5) Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference [now integrated into the archives of Dashnaktsoutyoun, Boston, Massachusetts], File 1406a/26a; W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921" (Cambridge, 1953), p. 465; Al. Khatisian, "Hayastani Hanrapetoutian tzagoumn ou zargatsoume" [The Creation and Development of the Republic of Armenia] (Athens, 1930), p. 38.
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