Smith's Appeals for Assistance
In the midst of this dilemma, Consul Smith continued dispatching his frantic messages to Washington. He was not enthused by the decision of Transcaucasia to parley in Trabizond and forwarded with obvious relish the Western Armenian Defence Council's declaration repudiating negotiations and pledging to continue the struggle. 34 In April, Secretary of State Lansing informed the American ambassador in Paris that Smith had on several occasions pointed out the threat of total Armenian extermination if help were not forthcoming. Smith claimed, with gross exaggerations, that the fifteen thousand Western Armenian and twenty-five thousand Eastern Armenian defenders could be doubled with Allied support, but that, instead the Allies were only aggravating the situation by their indifference and inactivity. Moslem bands were attacking Armenian villages in pursuance of what Smith considered a calculated German plot. He urged that two million dollars be placed at his disposal to strengthen three Eastern Armenian fortresses, which could block the Turkish advance for at least six months. Moreover, he complained bitterly about the inadequate and "piteously futile" British Military Mission in the Caucasus. 35 In Paris, Ambassador William Sharp, having inquired about Anglo-French intensions, reported to Washington that the Allied War Council had recognised the value of the Armenian and Georgian units as early as December, 1917, and had authorised certain expenditures for purchase of weapons and equipment from the retreating Russian soldiers. In addition, two million rubles had been dispatched, but unfortunately the money had not reached Baghdad in time to be transmitted to Tiflis. 36
Smith's persistence succeeded in eliciting some reserved inquiries from the Department of State, but it did not induce a modification of United States policy. On March 18 Smith received Ambassador Francis' note instructing him to adhere to the directive of November 2, 1917, prohibiting the encouragement of any measures that might lead to the segmentation of Russia or to civil war. 37 On March 30, 1918, Lansing informed Smith, "The United States in not in a position to support active military operation on the Caucasus front." Four days later he reported to Ambassador Walter page in London that holding the Caucasus depended on the Armenians; however, "As United States in not at war with Turkey this Government is prevented from taking action…" 38 By April, 1918, the Tiflis politicians should have relinquished any hope that the great democracy of the Western world would rise in defence of the "Transcaucasian Democracy."
The Trabizond Conference
Away from the theatre of war but affected by successful Turkish advance and capture of Erzurum, the Trabizond Peace Conference was called to order on March 14 by Husein Rauf Bey. The two delegations met until April 14 in six plenary sessions and several private interviews. During the opening ceremonies, Transcaucasia made its initial concession by waiving the established procedure of alternating the presidency of a conference when held on neutral ground. By allowing Rauf Bey to preside at all sessions, Chkhenkeli tactically recognised the validity of the Turkish contention that Trabizond was an Ottoman city. 39 After the customary exchange of goodwill address, Rauf asked insinuatingly about the state of affairs in Transcaucasia and about the jurisdiction of the Tiflis government. Was it qualified to participate in international negotiations? The Ottoman government requested information concerning the essence, form, and civil-political administration of Transcaucasia and questioned whether the "republic" had complied with the conditions established by international law for the creation of independent nations. 40 Discussions relating to the pointed and calculated interpellation showed that Turkey held the trump cards and used them to undermine every attempt pf Transcaucasia to prove it was a de facto government without officially having declared independence. One student of the subject has stated that "…the Seim and its delegation were trying to convince Turkey that Transcaucasia was an almost independent state, as though there were from the standpoint of international law such ting as ‘almost independence.'" 41
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