Transcaucasia's Quandary
Four days later, on March 25, the Presidium of the Seim, the Commissariat, and representatives of the several political fractions studied the report of the Trabizond delegates. Kachaznouni described the quagmire created by Rauf's insinuative questions. He was convinced that Turkey honestly desired a Transcaucasian state to serve as a buffer to Russia. However, doubting Transcaucasia's ability to withstand the expansion of the new masters of the North, the Ottoman rulers deemed it imperative to annex Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Laskhishvili verified Kachaznouni's account pf the Ottoman delegation's absolute refusal to discuss the subject of Western Armenia. Rauf had complained that this was the same old ruse the European Powers had employed in an attempt to strangle the Ottoman Empire. Haidarov maintained that Turkey had no territorial pretensions to Transcaucasia, desired no further conquest, but simply wished to exercise the privileges she had gained at Brest-Litovsk. Transcaucasia should not except the Sublime Porte to renounce its right to the three sanjaks, for even if it so desired, this would be impossible in view of the popular enthusiasm elicited in Turkey by the publication of Article IV of Brest-Litovsk. 50
No person at the emergency meeting explained more succinctly or more accurately than the Dashnakist Karjikian the reasons that compelled Transcaucasia to maintain an embarrassing ambiguity about its international status. A declaration of independence would have to be accompanied by an identification of the territorial bounds of the new state. Such a definition would, of necessity, include Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, and this in turn, would occasion renewed hostilities with Turkey. On the other hand, were independence proclaimed without the inclusion of the three sanjaks, Transcaucasia would not be independent at all. Thus, the declaration had to coincide with an agreement concerning the boundaries. Karjikian added that the discussion of Western Armenia should not be viewed as involvement in Ottoman affairs, for Transcaucasia had no annexationist ambitions. Interest in the fate of the eastern vilayets arose from dedication to the principle of self-determination. 51 Social Revolutionary Lordkipanidze observed a justifiable parallel between Turkey's preoccupation with its related peoples abroad and Transcaucasia's concern for the Western Armenians. Disagreeing with such statements, Mehtiev, on behalf of the Seim's Moslem members, demanded unconditional acceptance of the Brest terms, warning that, if Transcaucasia did not declare independence immediately, the Moslem fraction could not support further negotiations. A foreign minister, not a large delegation, should represent Transcaucasia at Trabizond. That the meeting did not resolve the indecision of the Tiflis government was evidenced by Zhordania's motion summoning the Seim to stand firm on its conditions for peace but also to authorise the delegation president to take the necessary steps leading to an "honourable settlement." 52 In a single breath resoluteness was demanded while concessions were permitted.
During the Seim's plenary session the following evening, 53 Noi Ramishvili headed the slate of orators. Repeating Karjikian's views, the Menshevik chief explained that a declaration of independence in conformity with Transcaucasian interests would institute a virtual ultimatum to Turkey. He saw advantages in continuing the tactic of ambiguity. It would allow the Ottomans more time to comprehend the advisability of making certain concessions, without which the buffer state they desired would never cone into existence. Could the Ottoman rulers fail to understand that a consolidated Transcaucasia having no imperialistic designs was much more valuable than a score of border fortress? In conclusion, Ramishvili urged that diplomatic tradition be respected during the negotiations in order to avoid the pitfalls experienced by Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. The delegation president should have the freedom to make "arrangements" on secondary matters so as not to jeopardise the cardinal interests of Transcaucasia. 54 Without agreeing on the issues of independence and inclusive territory, the Seim naming Chkhenkeli as Foreign Minister, resolved: "Standing on the basis of our decision of March 1, 1918, on the conditions of peace with Turkey, but desiring an honourable settlement for both parties, the Seim gives to Chkhenkeli, Peace Delegation President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, extraordinary powers to tale necessary steps in this direction." 55 Except for granting broader latitude to Chkhenkeli, the Seim did nothing to clarify Transcaucasia's legal position. Armenians, though voting for the resolution, were wary of Chkhenkeli's anti-Russian orientation, while the Moslems were impatient to proclaim the separation of the Caucasus from Russia and to accept Turkish terms for friendship. The conflicting views were the natural outgrowth of contradictory aspirations.
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