Armenia
The Urartu Civilisation
Victory for Independence
Artashisian Dynasty on the Armenian Throne
Armenia caught between Rome and the Arsacids
The Acceptance of Christianity
Defending Christianity
Armenia Under the Bagratouni Dynasty
Cilicia - the New Armenia
Armenia Under Turanian Rule
The Renaissance or the Resurrection of Armenia
The Eastern Question
Russia in the Caucasus
The Armenian Question
Battle on Two Fronts
Tsarist Russia Against the Armenians
The Revolution of the Young Turks and the Armenian People on the Eve of World War I
The First World War
The Resurrection of Armenia
Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918
- Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918
Eastern Armenia
Western Armenia
"The Fateful Years" (1914-1917)
"Hopes and Emotions" (March-October, 1917)
The Bolshevik Revolution and Armenia
Transcaucasia Adrift (November, 1917
Dilemmas (March-April, 1918)
War and Independence (April-May, 1918)
The Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia
The Suppliants (June-October, 1918)
In conclusion
Soviet Armenia
The Second Independent Republic of Armenia
Epilogue
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© 2008 ARMENICA.ORG
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With the first Armenian emperors of the Macedonian dynasty on the Byzantine throne, Byzantine appears to have taken stock of the situation and accepted the need of some necessary measures. The empire recognized the significance of the existence of Bagratouni Armenia, helping it become a mighty and firm wall against the Turkic invasions during the 10th and the 11th centuries. "Armenia was a valuable boulevard for Byzantine and should have been kept at any price." 96 It was the existence of Armenia which kept the plundering surges of the Central Asiatic tribes away for an entire century, forestalling the damage that had been done in Persia and other counties in the West and the Asia Minor.
Over time, however, irked by its long-standing religious dispute with Armenia and the ever-present desire for expansion, Byzantine failed to strengthen Bagratouni Armenia, despite the defence it was single-handedly providing on the eastern borders of the empire. This blind policy eventually resulted in the fatal actions of Basil II and his successors when Armenia in 1054 was forced to wage war on two fronts, against both Byzantine and the Seljuk Turks. This ended in the inevitable defeat at Manazkert in 1071, when the gates of Asia Minor were opened to the Turks who struck such a heavy blow on Byzantine that it was never able to recover.
Undeterred, Byzantine continued the same ill-fated policy towards the New Armenia and the crusaders. The emperors in the Comnenos dynasty of Byzantine seemed more interested in forcing Armenia and the crusader states to war on two fronts, than in dedicating themselves to averting the real danger and driving the Turks out from Asia Minor. The result of this unwise policy was the unavoidable and decisive defeat of the Byzantine army by the army of sultan Ghelich Arsalan II, at Myrioképhalon in 1176. This defeat marked almost the hundred year anniversary of the decisive battle at Manazkert which confirmed the presence of the Turks in Asia Minor.
Together with Jacques de Morgan we can draw the conclusion that: "What Byzantine needed in Armenia was neither a servant nor a slave, but that this country be kept as an ally and an independent country stretching from Tigris to the Black Sea and from Euphrates to the Caspian Sea, with its population of two million, prepared to supply the empire with countless legions of warriors to drive out the enemy of Christianity. And Armenia was capable of providing such an army. The creation and the preservation of such a country would guarantee the existence of Byzantine. But the most important political direction in Constantinople had been lost along with the Roman Empire, torn apart as it was by internal conflicts and an unorganised imperial court." 99
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96) Schlumberger, Un Emperor byzantin au X siècle, Paris, Nicéphore Phocas, Paris, 1890, p. 352
99) Jacques de Morgan, Histoire du Peuple arménien, Paris, 1919, p. 160
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